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The Concealed Cost of Convenience: 
Protecting Personal Data Privacy in the 
Age of Alexa 
Lauren Bass* 
In today’s interconnected, internet-dependent, global infor-
mation economy, consumers willingly, but often unwittingly, divulge 
to tech companies their personal and private data—frequently with 
little regard for its safekeeping or intended future use. 
Enter Alexa, Amazon’s voice-activated, natural-language  
processing digital smart assistant. A sophisticated artificial intelli-
gence (“AI”), Alexa insinuates itself into a user’s personal sphere, 
learns from and adapts to the surrounding environment, siphons 
personal information and data, and ultimately produces for the user 
a perfectly tailored, concierge experience. Convenience is the prod-
uct. Data privacy is the cost. 
Over one half of American consumers own an Alexa-enabled  
device or other AI-powered digital smart assistant. This rapid adop-
tion of AI technology has created the potential for an untenable and 
unsustainable surveillance state in which private data brokers such 
as Amazon can control the flow of information and hold hostage the 
individual consumer. 
The existing U.S. legal framework—a sectoral regime heavily 
dependent upon the principals of “Notice and Choice,” under  
the ineffectual oversight of the Federal Trade Commission—is ill-
equipped to deal with the privacy issues presented by the AI-based 
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encouragement of IPLJ Senior Writing & Research Editor, Elliot Fink, and Professor 
Olivier Sylvain.  I would also like to thank my family for their unwavering support—
especially my mother for being my mentor, my sounding board, and my first writing 
teacher. 
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data collection of smart assistants. The time for comprehensive  
federal data privacy reform is now. The states should not shoulder 
this burden. Instead, Congress must act to establish a uniform  
system of rules that will federally regulate the collection and  
retention practices of data brokers and safeguard the autonomy and 
data privacy of the individual. 
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Home Surveillance—the term conjures images of conspicuously 
placed cameras along the perimeter of one’s domicile, judiciously 
employed for security purposes to monitor and prevent access from 
outside intruders or bad actors. Today, however, the term home  
surveillance more aptly describes the technology employed inside a 
modern “smart” home.1 Marketed as a gadget of convenience, the 
voice-enabled smart assistant—a recent addition to the Internet of 
Things (“IoT”)2—purports to aid daily life, automating simple and 
mundane tasks such as regulating the thermostat3 or ordering a 
pizza.4 Beneath the sleek futuristic exterior, however, a smart  
 
1 See Anick Jesdanun, Advances in Smart Home Tech Raise Privacy Concerns, CLAIMS 
J. (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.claimsjournal.com/news/national/2019/01/08/288630.htm 
[https://perma.cc/78LS-YCM5] (quoting Jeff Chester, executive director for the Center for 
Digital Democracy, as saying, “It’s decentralized surveillance . . . . We’re living in a world 
where we’re tethered to some online service stealthily gathering our information.”). 
2 The Internet of Things (“IoT”) refers to “the network of physical objects that contain 
embedded technology to communicate and sense or interact with their internal states or the 
external environment.” See Internet of Things, GARTNER.COM: IT GLOSSARY, 
https://www.gartner.com/it-glossary/internet-of-things [https://perma.cc/6EQ3-AG4D]. 
For a more detailed explanation of the history and evolution of IoT, see Knud Lasse Luth, 
Why the Internet of Things Is Called Internet of Things: Definition, History, 
Disambiguation, IOT ANALYTICS (Dec. 19, 2014), https://iot-analytics.com/internet-of-
things-definition/ [https://perma.cc/8LY9-9DYV]. This Note focuses solely on Alexa-
enabled AI digital assistants, a small subsection of IoT. 
3 See, e.g., Nest Learning Thermostat Overview, NEST, https://nest.com/thermostats/
nest-learning-thermostat/overview/ [https://perma.cc/UAW3-TBGF]. 
4 See Eugene Kim, The Inside Story of How Amazon Created Echo, the Next Billion-
Dollar Business No One Saw Coming, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 2, 2016, 12:01 PM), 
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assistant is little more than surveillance equipment—cameras,  
microphones, and AI learning centers—embedded into the home  
under the guise of “the next big thing in computing.”5 This new form 
of constant surveillance no longer aims to keep out, but rather  
to draw in—engaging and ensnaring consumers into allowing  
the mavericks of Silicon Valley to indiscriminately collect, mine, 
store, and analyze endless amounts of data willingly offered by their  
subjects, all under the façade of convenience.6 
This rapid adoption of AI technology, substantially in the form 
of voice-enabled smart assistants like Amazon’s Alexa, has created 
the potential for a monopolistic surveillance state in which Amazon 
and other private data brokers dominate, controlling the flow  
of information, wielding immense market power, and essentially 
holding the individual consumer hostage.7 Afraid of stifling innova-
tion and dampening the progress of capitalism,8 Congress, to date, 
has maintained an arms-length approach to regulating both Silicon 
Valley and its Big Data practices. However, as AI voice-technology 
continues to infiltrate and embed itself into the daily fabric, the  
prevailing U.S. legal framework—a sectoral regime heavily reliant 
upon the fair information principles of Notice and Choice9 coupled 
with limited Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) oversight—is ill-




5 Elad Natanson, Artificial Intelligence Smart Assistants: The Next Big Thing in 
Computing?, FORBES (June 22, 2017, 7:42 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/elad
natanson/2017/06/22/artificial-intelligence-smart-assistants-the-next-big-thing-in-
computing/#19d371534252 [https://perma.cc/A9U6-HV8A]. 
6 See Jesdanun, supra note 1; see also John Paul Titlow, Smart Homes: Our Next 
Digital Privacy Nightmare, READWRITE (Mar. 18, 2013), https://readwrite.com/
2013/03/18/smart-homes-our-next-digital-privacy-nightmare/ [https://perma.cc/P5N4-
5FDW]. 
7 See Katharine Schwab, Amazon Could Soon Force You to Go on a Diet, According to 
One Futurist, FAST CO. (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90322180/
amazon-could-soon-force-you-to-go-on-a-diet-according-to-one-futurist 
[https://perma.cc/7SPT-46AK]. 
8 See Omar Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Privacy in the Age of Big Data: A Time for Big 
Decisions, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 63, 63 (2012) (warning that a “regulatory backlash” 
could dampen the data economy and stifle innovation).  
9 See ARI EZRA WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST: INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN 
INFORMATION AGE 80–83 (2018). 
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procedures of data-hungry tech companies, leaving consumers prey 
to abuses and violations in the collection, storage, and manipulation 
of their personal information.10 
This Note argues that the time for comprehensive federal  
legislative privacy reform of the tech sector and its voracious data 
consumption practice is now. Using Amazon’s voice-enabled AI, 
Alexa, as an illustrative example, this Note identifies key data  
privacy11 issues raised by the rapid expansion and embrace of voice-
enabled smart assistants, interrogates the effectiveness of the current 
legal privacy paradigms in protecting consumer privacy, and  
 
10 For the purposes of this Note, “personal information” will encapsulate both personally 
identifiable information (“PII”) (see definition below) and non-PII, as advances in  
de-anonymization techniques have blurred the lines such that even non-PII may be easily 
used to identify an individual. See Kelsey Campbell-Dollaghan, Sorry, Your Data Can Still 
Be Identified Even If It’s Anonymized, FAST COMPANY (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.fast
company.com/90278465/sorry-your-data-can-still-be-identified-even-its-anonymized 
[https://perma.cc/ZT53-7VNX]. PII is defined as:  
[A]ny information about an individual . . . including (1) any 
information that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s 
identity, such as name, social security number, date and place of birth, 
mother’s maiden name, or biometric records; and (2) any other 
information that is linked or linkable to an individual . . . .  
ERIKA MCCALLISTER, TIM GRANCE & KAREN SCARFONE, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & 
TECH., SPECIAL PUB. 800–122, GUIDE TO PROTECTING THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF 
PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION (PII) 2–1 (Apr. 2010) (quoting U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-08-536, PRIVACY: ALTERNATIVES EXIST FOR ENHANCING 
PROTECTION OF PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION 1 n.1 (2008). The National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”) explains:  
To distinguish an individual is to identify that individual . . . . To trace 
an individual is to process sufficient information to make a 
determination about a specific aspect of an individual’s activities or 
status . . . . Linked information is information about or related to an 
individual that is logically associated with other information about the 
individual. In contrast, linkable information is information about or 
related to an individual for which there is a possibility of logical 
association with other information about the individual.  
Id. 
11 Data privacy, also synonymous with “informational privacy,” is defined as “the ability 
to determine for yourself when and how others may collect and use your information.” 
Robert H. Sloan & Richard Warner, Beyond Notice and Choice: Privacy, Norms and 
Consent, 14 J. HIGH TECH. L. 370, 373 (2014). Note that data privacy differs from data 
protection, which deals with the securing of one’s data against unauthorized access. The 
former is a legal issue, while the latter a technical one. See Rick Robinson, Data Privacy 
vs. Data Protection, IPSWITCH (Jan. 29, 2018), https://blog.ipswitch.com/data-privacy-vs-
data-protection [https://perma.cc/5LPY-KMH6]. 
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investigates potential solutions for the future. Part I examines the 
history and conception of personal privacy in Anglo-American law, 
as well as the threats posed by the expansion of AI and Big Data as  
embodied by Amazon’s virtual smart assistant, Alexa. Part II  
exposes the fundamental differences between the privacy models 
implemented by the United States and the European Union (“EU”), 
explains the origins of the existing U.S. privacy paradigm, and  
queries that paradigm’s ability to adequately regulate the private 
sector or protect individuals from privacy threats posed by rapidly 
advancing and unregulated AI technology. Part III explores the ways 
in which the law permits widespread unchecked collection of  
personal data by AI smart assistants and analyzes the limitations that 
the current operating framework presents. Part IV eyes the future 
and proposes reforms to the existing data privacy regime. 
I. OVERVIEW 
A. Anglo-American Conceptions of Privacy 
The concepts of privacy and the protection of the individual 
against outside intrusive forces are fundamental tenets underlying 
much of Anglo-American jurisprudence.12 The doctrines permeate 
property and tort law, under which the right to exclude has become 
one of the “most essential sticks” in an individual’s “bundle of 
rights.”13 The principles are embedded in the U.S. Constitution in 
the First Amendment (which protects the privacy of one’s personal  
beliefs),14 the Third Amendment (which prohibits the mandatory 
quartering of soldiers in one’s home),15 the Fourth Amendment 
(which secures a “right of the people” against unwarranted and  
violative government intrusion upon “persons,” “houses” and  
 
12 For a more detailed explanation of the origin of the maxim and its impact on Anglo-
American law, see Jonathan L. Hafetz, “A Man’s Home Is His Castle?”: Reflections on 
the Home, the Family, and Privacy During the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth 
Centuries, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 175, 175 (2002). 
13 See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979); Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982); United States v. Craft, 
535 U.S. 274, 283 (2002). 
14 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
15 See id. amend. III. 
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“effects”),16 and the Fifth Amendment (which protects personal in-
formation and privacy by proscribing self-incrimination).17 Eleven 
state constitutions echo the federal provisions and provide even  
further explicit protections for individuals and their privacy rights.18 
Although the courts have stopped short of specifically defining that 
one is entitled to a “right to privacy,” they have repeatedly employed 
the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to recognize and protect an 
intrinsic interest in individual autonomy, which has helped to shield 
minors from the detriments of indecent speech,19 permit adult  
possession of pornography,20 and safeguard couples’ sovereignty 
within the bedroom.21 
In the late nineteenth century, following the advent of the  
instantaneous camera and portable audio recording devices, both of 
which had the potential to readily breach individual privacy as well 
 
16 See id. amend. IV. Although helpful here as an illustrative example, in general, the 
Fourth Amendment and its protections of privacy fall outside the scope of this Note. 
17 See id. amend. V. 
18 See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 (“The right of the people to privacy is recognized and 
shall not be infringed.”); ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8 (“No person shall be disturbed in his 
private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.”); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 
(“All people . . . have inalienable rights. Among these are . . . privacy.”); FLA. CONST. art. 
I, § 12 (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, and against the unreasonable interception of 
private communications by any means, shall not be violated.”); HAW. CONST. art. I, §§ 6–
7 (“The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed without the 
showing of a compelling state interest.”); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6 (“The people shall have 
the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and other possessions against 
unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions of privacy or interceptions of communications 
by eavesdropping devices or other means.”); LA. CONST. art. I, § 5 (“Every person shall be 
secure in his person, property, communications, houses, papers, and effects against 
unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy.”); MONT. CONST. art. II § 10 
(“The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall 
not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest.”); N.H. CONST. pt. 1, 
art. 2-b (“An individual’s right to live free from governmental intrusion in private or 
personal information is natural, essential, and inherent.”); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“The 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures and unreasonable invasions of privacy shall not be 
violated . . . .”); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“No person shall be disturbed in his private 
affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.”). 
19 See Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 731 (1978). 
20 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969). 
21 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558, 574 (2003). 
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as the sanctity of the home,22 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis 
penned their seminal treatise,23 which introduced the common law 
principle of an individual’s right “to be let alone.”24 Drawing on  
the doctrine of property—specifically that of exclusion25—this  
inherent privacy right aimed to safeguard one’s human dignity and 
individuality,26 or, as Warren and Brandeis termed it, the “inviolate 
personality.”27 According to their theory, an individual possesses 
exclusive control over his “thoughts, sentiments, and emotions,”  
or, in other words, his personal and private data.28 Such “posses-
sions,” argued Warren and Brandeis, could not (and should not) be 
appropriated (or misappropriated) by another without the  
individual’s express consent.29 
Warren and Brandeis loathed the idea that the gossip journalists’ 
cameras and recording machines could intrude in any way upon their 
seclusion.30 These “mechanical devices,” they warned, “threaten to 
make good the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall 
be proclaimed from the house-tops.’”31 To counteract any such  
unsanctioned invasion of privacy, Warren and Brandeis contended,  
the injurious violation of privacy by technology—the surreptitious  
taking of photographs or audio recordings—must be recognized  
as legally cognizable harms,32 which could be identified and  
subsequently remedied in common-law tort proceedings.33 
 
22 See WALDMAN, supra note 9, at 16. 
23 See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 
193 (1890). 
24 Id. at 195. While commonly attributed to Warren and Brandeis, Thomas M. Cooley 
originally coined the phrase, the right “to be let alone” a decade earlier in his 1879 treatise. 
See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE 
INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 29 (1879). 
25 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 23, at 216. 
26 Edward Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean 
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 991 (1964). 
27 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 23, at 205, 211. 
28 Id. at 198. 
29 See id.  
30 See id. at 195, 206; see also Robert Grace, Warren & Brandeis: The Right to Curate 
an Identity, PHOTOBOX GROUP SECURITY BLOG (Dec. 4, 2017), https://pbx-group-security. 
com/blog/2017/12/04/the-right-to-curate-an-identity/ [https://perma.cc/TZC8-4BYT]. 
31 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 23, at 195. 
32 See id. at 206. 
33 See id. at 211. 
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Warren and Brandeis’s “natural right” proved influential upon 
the courts34 and state legislatures.35 However, it was the codification  
of their principals within tort law by William Prosser that solidified 
those theories as the dominant Anglo-American approach to pri-
vacy.36 In the late 1960s, Prosser surveyed the litigation landscape 
and identified four civil rights of action under which to classify  
privacy tort suits: (1) intrusion upon seclusion; (2) public disclosure 
of private facts; (3) publicity placing one in a false light; and (4) 
appropriation of one’s likeness for the advantage of another.37 Born 
as they were out of Warren and Brandeis’s philosophies, Prosser’s 
torts naturally borrowed from the same underlying principles. Each 
tort invoked the doctrines and language of trespass, exclusion, and 
theft, and framed the legal harm as one of unauthorized access: a 
right of the individual to protect his person and his home by keeping 
others out.38 
Scholars have argued that Prosser’s contextualization of a  
privacy doctrine within the consolidated torts has been a “mixed” 
blessing.39 On the one hand, it has provided courts with a clear  
categorization for inflicted harm.40 On the other, it has stunted the 
growth and evolution of privacy law by allowing courts to rely 
solely on an artificial taxonomy rather than on a broad and malleable 
conceptualization.41 As Professors Neil M. Richards and Daniel J. 
Solove contend, “[b]efore Prosser, courts looked to Warren and 
Brandeis’s article and examined whether particular harms fell under 
the very broad principle of the ‘right to be let alone.’ After Prosser, 
courts looked to whether a particular harm fit into one of Prosser’s 
four categories.”42 The privacy harms threatening individuals  
today—namely Silicon Valley’s unregulated collection, storage and 
manipulation of personal data via new technology such as AI smart 
 
34 See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 73–74 (Ga. 1905). 
35 See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 2019). 
36 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B–D (AM. LAW. INST. 1977). 
37 See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). 
38 See WALDMAN, supra note 9, at 95. 
39 See generally Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed 
Legacy, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1887 (2010). 
40 See id. at 1915 (arguing that “[a]fter Prosser, courts looked to whether a particular 
harm fit into one of Prosser’s four categories”). 
41 See id. 
42 Id. 
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assistants—cannot be accurately confined to or remedied by 
Prosser’s torts. Instead they require a broader conceptualization that 
can adjust to the changing technological landscape and the emerging 
harms. As a result, privacy torts have failed as a viable solution to 
privacy threats facing Americans today. 
Privacy is also inherently normative. Therefore, social, eco-
nomic, and even religious concerns have further influenced and 
shaped Anglo-American conceptions and perceptions of privacy. 
Take, for example, the biblical parable of the Garden of Eden. When 
coaxed by the serpent, Eve finally eats the apple from the Tree of 
Knowledge.43 Upon acquiring “knowledge,” she immediately has an 
innate sense that her “privacy” is being invaded by Adam’s gaze, so 
she protects her right to privacy with a well-placed fig leaf.44  
Today’s fig leaves take the forms of walls, doors, window dressings, 
and security surveillance systems. These physical barriers express 
an intrinsic sense of liberty and property—a need to protect one’s 
interests in person and possessions. We exclude that which we fear; 
we include that which we trust. 
A man’s home is his castle, and he protects it as such.45 When 
threats to the home manifest as physical intrusions, they are easy  
to identify and ward off. But what happens when the privacy  
veil of the home is pierced, and the evil that one has previously  
endeavored to exclude becomes that which one is now eager and 
willing to include? 
B. Amazon’s AI, Alexa 
Enter Alexa, Amazon’s voice-enabled, natural-language  
processing, digital AI assistant.46 First introduced in 2014, Alexa is 
 
43 See Genesis 3:6. 
44 See id. 
45 “That the house of every one [sic] is to him as his Castle . . . domus sua cuique est 
tutissimum refugium.” SIR EDWARD COKE, SELECTED WRITINGS OF SIR EDWARD COKE, 
VOL. 1, at 137 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003). See also Gary Martin, The Meaning and Origin 
of the Expression: An Englishman’s Home Is His Castle, PHRASE FINDER, 
https://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/an-englishmans-home-is-his-castle.html 
[https://perma.cc/W8ES-L2FC]. 
46 See Megan Trout, Amazon—A Winning Strategy Continues with Alexa, HARV. BUS. 
SCH.: DIGITAL INITIATIVE (Feb. 1, 2017), https://digit.hbs.org/submission/amazon-a-
winning-strategy-continues-with-alexa/ [https://perma.cc/LJ4N-PGY5]. 
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the central nervous system and brain that powers Echo, Amazon’s 
sleek smart speaker.47 Originally offered as a hands-free means by 
which to control one’s music collection,48 today’s Alexa has evolved 
from a simple DJ49 to a ubiquitous and trusted household presence 
tasked with the responsibility of unlocking the front door,50 turning 
on the lights,51 regulating the thermostat,52 ordering dinner,53  
assisting the kids with their homework,54 cleaning the house,55  
and, at the end of a long day, even helping one to drift off into a  
quiet slumber.56 
Although colloquially, the terms Echo and Alexa are often used 
interchangeably, they actually represent two very different entities 
within the larger Amazon ecosystem. The former refers to the  
 
47 See Christina Bonnington, Amazon Alexa Is the Home Assistant You Never Knew You 
Needed, DAILY DOT (Mar. 4, 2019, 11:40 AM), https://www.dailydot.com/debug/amazon-
alexa/ [https://perma.cc/CGF2-VXMF]. 
48 See Matt Weinberger, How Amazon’s Echo Went from a Smart-Speaker to the Center 
of Your Home, BUS. INSIDER (May 23, 2017, 6:08 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/
amazon-echo-and-alexa-history-from-speaker-to-smart-home-hub-2017-5 
[https://perma.cc/63ZS-KBYD]. 
49 See Dan Moren, How to Play Amazon Music Using Alexa, TOM’S GUIDE (Nov. 28, 
2018, 12:40 PM), https://www.tomsguide.com/us/alexa-amazon-music,review-4512.html 
[https://perma.cc/5X2X-D3LK]. 
50 See Leena Rao, Amazon’s Alexa Now Can Lock Your Front Door, FORBES (July 28, 
2016), http://fortune.com/2016/07/28/alexa-amazon-august-smart-lock/ [https://perma.cc/
BLT3-22SJ]; see also Control Your August Smart Lock with Amazon Alexa, AUGUST, 
https://www.august.com/pages/alexa [https://perma.cc/ A786-9DF5]. 
51 See Lori Gil, How to Control Your Lights with Amazon Echo, IMORE (Nov. 13, 2018), 
https://www.imore.com/how-control-your-lights-amazon-echo [https://perma.cc/Q2H9-
RU88]. 
52 See Jason Fitzpatrick, How to Control Your Nest Learning Thermostat with Alexa, 
HOW-TO GEEK (June 20, 2017, 4:53 PM), https://www.howtogeek.com/247553/how-to-
control-your-nest-learning-thermostat-with-alexa/ [https://perma.cc/ETB8-MV2C]. 
53 See Chelsea Stone, Amazon Alexa Can Now Help You Order Takeout, SELF (Jan. 5, 
2017), https://www.self.com/story/amazon-alexa-now-orders-takeout [https://perma.cc/
2EHR-L2CZ]. 
54 See Tyler Lacoma, 6 Ways Alexa Can Help Kids with Their Homework, DIGITAL 
TRENDS (Feb. 26, 2019, 1:33 PM), https://www.digitaltrends.com/home/6-ways-alexa-
can-help-kids-with-their-homework/ [https://perma.cc/NGP2-C7DK]. 
55 See Alina Bradford, How Alexa Can Help You Clean Your House, CNET (Apr. 24, 
2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.cnet.com/how-to/how-to-clean-your-house-with-alexa/ 
[https://perma.cc/3X79-DPWY]. 
56 See Victoria Hoff, How I Hacked My Amazon Echo to Help Me Sleep Better, BYRDIE 
(Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.byrdie.com/amazon-echo-sleep-tips [https://perma.cc/T2W6-
TQQL]. 
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physical hardware that consumers purchase—the smart speaker that 
sits atop a counter in the kitchen or a nightstand in the bedroom and 
functions as a portal to Amazon’s remote cloud servers.57 The latter 
refers to the disembodied voice that represents the human-AI  
interaction—an aural personification of the complex neural  
network58 that engages each time a user interacts with Amazon’s 
intricate AI technology.59 
Amazon actively markets its line of Alexa-enabled devices as 
“your family’s friend”60—technology designed to make “life easier” 
and “more fun.”61 Beneath the attractive Madison Avenue sales 
pitch, however, Alexa, as embodied in the Echo, is a Trojan horse—
an intelligent surveillance and data collection system earning  
entrance into personal spaces such as the home or office under the 
guise of “next gen” concierge tech.62 Equipped with microphones, 
digital cameras, computer learning centers, an unquenchable thirst 
for consumer data, and the infinite capacity to store collected  
information in the cloud,63 these AI-powered smart-home assistants 
gain unfettered access to the most private areas of a user’s life, both 
physically—stationed in the living room, the kitchen, the dining 
 
57 See Marie Black, What Is Amazon Echo? A Complete Guide, TECH ADVISOR (June 10, 
2019), https://www.techadvisor.co.uk/news/audio/amazon-echo-3584881/ [https://perma.
cc/36LL-DRBS]. 
58 “A neural network is a type of machine learning which models itself after the human 
brain. This creates an artificial neural network that via an algorithm allows the computer 
to learn by incorporating new data . . . termed deep learning.” Jonas DeMuro, What Is a 
Neural Network?, TECHRADAR (Aug. 11, 2018), https://www.techradar.com/news/what-
is-a-neural-network [https://perma.cc/9BLD-U7QH]. 
59 Kate Crawford & Vladan Joler, Anatomy of an AI System: The Amazon Echo as an 
Anatomical Map of Human Labor, Data, and Planetary Resources, AI NOW INST. & SHARE 
LAB (Sept. 7, 2018), https://anatomyof.ai/ [https://perma.cc/3HM5-NB4C]. 
60 Chris Davies, How Private Is Amazon Echo?, SLASH GEAR (Nov. 7, 2014, 11:22 AM), 
https://www.slashgear.com/how-private-is-amazon-echo-07354486/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q4E6-569F]. 
61 Alexa User Guide: Learn What Alexa Can Do, AMAZON, https://amzn.to/2RkP9DA 
[https://perma.cc/TU5F-4R6S]. 
62 Shashank M, Rise of the Smart Home Assistants, MEDIUM (May 31, 2018), 
https://medium.com/@shanky101/rise-of-the-smart-home-assistants-e3fb7d3a9f58 
[https://perma.cc/29AD-3ELM]. 
63 See Kim Wetzel, What Is Alexa, and What Can Amazon’s Virtual Assistant Do for 
You?, DIGITAL TRENDS (Feb. 16, 2019, 7:25 AM), https://www.digitaltrends.com/home/
what-is-amazons-alexa-and-what-can-it-do [https://perma.cc/S5PL-HWAD]. 
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room and even the bedroom64—and emotionally, as users willingly 
divulge personal and often confidential information. 
Once inside a user’s private sphere, Alexa remains ever vigilant 
and always listening.65 Like Beyoncé, Alexa simply asks that you 
say her name66 to call her to action.67 Her functionality, however, is 
not self-contained within the hardware; Alexa and her intelligence 
exist wholly on Amazon’s cloud servers. Therefore, all requests are 
recorded and transmitted to Amazon for processing.68 To accom-
plish this, Alexa remains constantly tethered to the internet to allow 
 
64 See Tom Warren, Amazon’s Echo Spot Is a Sneaky Way to Get a Camera into Your 
Bedroom, VERGE (Sept. 28, 2017, 10:02 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/9/28/
16378472/amazons-echo-spot-camera-in-your-bedroom [https://perma.cc/2M4B-7QSZ]. 
65 See Jenna Wortham, How Alexa Fits into Amazon Prime’s Directive, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG. (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/24/magazine/how-alexa-fits-
into-amazons-prime-directive.html [https://perma.cc/VUQ3-ZE4U]. 
66 See DESTINY’S CHILD, Say My Name, on THE WRITING’S ON THE WALL (Columbia 
Records 1999). 
67 See Grant Clauser, What Is Alexa? What is the Amazon Echo, and Should You Get 
One?, WIRECUTTER (Jan. 29, 2019), https://thewirecutter.com/reviews/what-is-alexa-
what-is-the-amazon-echo-and-should-you-get-one/ [https://perma.cc/WF9G-JLQB]. 
68 See id. It should be noted that Amazon permits a user to delete recordings—or even 
the entire history—from its account. Such deletion of the file, however, does not 
necessarily guarantee complete deletion of the information contained within that file. 
Amazon is less than transparent as to whether deletion from a user’s account also means 
deletion from Amazon’s servers. See Conor Allison, How to Delete Your Amazon Alexa 
Voice History, AMBIENT (July 3, 2019), https://www.the-ambient.com/how-to/delete-
voice-recordings-amazon-alexa-134 [https://perma.cc/VRF3-SKP5]; see also Alfred Ng, 
Amazon Alexa Transcripts Live On, Even After You Delete Voice Records, CNET (May 9, 
2019, 7:40 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/amazon-alexa-transcripts-live-on-even-
after-you-delete-voice-records/ [https://perma.cc/V5KD-PERC]. It should be further noted 
that Amazon recently came under scrutiny for allowing recordings to be examined and 
studied by human engineers without user consent. See Matt Day, Giles Turner & Natalie 
Drozdiak, Amazon Workers Are Listening to What You Tell Alexa, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 10, 
2019, 3:34 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-10/is-anyone-
listening-to-you-on-alexa-a-global-team-reviews-audio [https://perma.cc/3BZ7-T4WX]. 
Since that scandal broke, Amazon has revised their policies to allow for users to opt-out of 
the human review system. See Matt Day, Amazon Gives Option to Disable Human Review 
on Alexa, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 2, 2019, 4:03 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2019-08-02/amazon-gives-option-to-disable-human-review-of-alexa-recordings 
[https://perma.cc/D9FY-64R6]. 
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data to flow freely back and forth from the connected home to  
Amazon’s cloud and processing servers.69 
Alexa’s ability to learn from and adapt to her surroundings 
makes her attractive and unique to a user seeking a customized  
concierge experience.70 It also makes her dangerous. Like Audrey 
II’s insatiable appetite for blood in Little Shop of Horrors,71 Alexa 
feeds on a constant diet of user data. The more data a user provides 
about her needs and desires, the better and more tailored the service 
that Alexa delivers,72 and in turn, the more the user becomes  
enmeshed with and dependent upon Amazon’s ecosystem.73 A  
casual or occasional Alexa user might only provide Amazon with 
the minimum basic information required to operate the device,  
such as one’s name or email. If a user wants to expand Alexa’s func-
tionality to facilitate in-app purchases or Amazon Prime home 
deliveries, the user might then provide Amazon with a credit card or 
banking information, a cell phone number, and a shipping address. 
The more sophisticated the convenience a user requires from Alexa, 
the more information Alexa (and, by proxy, Amazon) demands to 
accomplish each of the requested tasks. For example, in order  
for Alexa to place a phone call, she needs to gain access to a user’s  
contact list or address book, which might include personal  
information about friends, family members, and even business  
associates.74 In order to use Alexa to schedule appointments, a user 
must not only provide information about what kinds of services are 
required, but also grant Alexa access to cloud-based calendars.75 To 
employ Alexa to hail an Uber, a user must grant Alexa access to her 
 
69 See Aaron Paul Calvin, Can Amazon’s Alexa Be Your Friend?, DIGG (Mar. 30, 2017, 
9:44 PM), http://digg.com/2017/amazon-alexa-is-not-your-friend [https://perma.cc/34EP-
3C5H]. 
70 See id. 
71 See LITTLE SHOP OF HORRORS (Warner Bros. 1986). 
72 See Calvin, supra note 69 (explaining that the more one uses the device, the more 
Alexa adapts to speech patterns, vocabulary, and personal preferences). 
73 See Schwab, supra note 7. 
74 See Jake Smith, Amazon Alexa Calling: How to Set It Up and Use It on Your Echo, 
ZDNET (May 30, 2017, 1:42 PM), https://www.zdnet.com/article/amazon-alexa-calling-
how-to-set-it-up-and-use-it/ [https://perma.cc/F2JD-4T3L]. 
75 See Hugh Langley, How to Link and Use Your Calendar with Alexa, AMBIENT (July 
19, 2019), https://www.the-ambient.com/how-to/schedule-sync-calendar-alexa-640 
[https://perma.cc/UCJ5-QBHX]. 
2019] THE CONCEALED COST OF CONVENIENCE 275 
GPS location data, the information about her destination, as well  
as direct access to the user’s Uber account, which may contain  
credit card information, contact information, and other personal (or 
personally identifiable) information.76 With each interaction, Alexa 
and her neural network become increasingly privy to larger volumes 
of a user’s personal information and more entrenched in that  
user’s daily life. Behind the scenes, Amazon gains greater access  
to the perpetual collection, storage, and manipulation of the  
user’s information. 
Part of Alexa’s appeal is that she can be further tailored to cater 
to her user’s every whim through the acquisition of “skills”— 
downloadable third-party add-ons, similar to mobile phone apps, 
that increase her aptitude, intelligence and functionality.77 As of  
January 2019, the Amazon marketplace boasted over seventy  
thousand skills that Alexa had the potential to “learn.”78 Alexa’s 
modularity and upgradeability increase her attractiveness as a virtual 
assistant and help to maintain the allure of the integrated invisible 
concierge experience that Amazon desires for its customers. 
Amazon aspires for Alexa to permeate every facet of daily 
life79—to be omnipresent and indispensable.80 Based on recent  
 
76 See Britta O’Boyle, What Is Alexa and What Can Amazon Echo Do?, POCKET-LINT 
(Dec. 26, 2018), https://www.pocket-lint.com/smart-home/news/amazon/138846-what-is-
alexa-how-does-it-work-and-what-can-amazons-alexa-do [https://perma.cc/EV2X-
RYFP]; Privacy Policy: Data Collections and Uses, UBER, https://privacy.uber.com/
policy/ [https://perma.cc/XQS6-HV9Q] (effective May 25, 2018) (describing how Uber 
and its affiliates collect and use personal information to provide services). For a detailed 
explanation of personally identifiable information, see Campbell-Dollaghan, supra note 
10. 
77 See Eric Griffith & Rob Marvin, The Best Amazon Alexa Skills, PC MAGAZINE (June 
12, 2018, 5:40 PM), https://www.pcmag.com/article/352136/the-best-amazon-alexa-skills 
[https://perma.cc/EE7K-T9GY]. 
78 See Dieter Bohn, Amazon Says 100 Million Alexa Devices Have Been Sold—What’s 
Next?, VERGE (Jan. 4, 2019, 4:00 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/1/4/18168565/
amazon-alexa-devices-how-many-sold-number-100-million-dave-limp [https://perma.cc/
VM3Y-Q3DC]. 
79 See Heather Kelly, Amazon Wants Alexa Everywhere, CNN BUS. (Sept. 22, 2018, 
10:14 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/09/22/technology/alexa-everywhere/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/28QK-5F3H]. 
80 See Scott Davis, How Amazon’s Brand and Customer Experience Became 
Synonymous, FORBES (July 14, 2016, 2:50 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/scottdavis/
2016/07/14/how-amazons-brand-and-customer-experience-became-synonymous/ 
[https://perma.cc/W6CG-5CP5]. 
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statistics, the company is well on its way to achieving that goal.  
Although usually reluctant to divulge actual market share or sales 
figures, Amazon’s Senior Vice President of Devices and Services, 
Dave Limp, recently revealed that as of January 2019, the company 
had sold over one hundred million Alexa-equipped devices world-
wide81 and increased its annual domestic Prime subscriptions by ten 
million to reach over one hundred million U.S. subscribers.82 In  
light of these figures, it is interesting to note that over 150 Alexa-
equipped products currently exist on the market, but fewer than fifty 
of those products are actually manufactured by Amazon.83 Those 
two seemingly disparate figures coexist with Amazon’s blessing  
because the true value to Amazon lies in the information that can be 
mined from users’ adoption and integration of the AI, not in the 
nominal profit derived from the sale of the devices themselves.84 
Alexa extracts the data; therefore, Alexa exerts the power.85 
C. The Rise and Influence of Big Data 
Data collection and data mining—the siphoning and analyzing 
of a subject’s data in order to predict future events or behaviors86—
is not a novel concept borne out of the twenty-first century. On the 
contrary, its origins date back to at least the eighteenth century and 
 
81 See Bohn, supra note 78. This figure represents total units sold containing Alexa; it 
does not break down by specific devices. See id. 
82 See J. Clement, Number of Amazon Prime Members in the United States as of June 
2019, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/546894/number-of-amazon-prime-
paying-members/ [https://perma.cc/84J6-LCN3] (citing that as of June 2019, Amazon had 
an estimated 105 million U.S. Amazon Prime subscribers). 
83 See id.; see also Bohn, supra note 78. 
84 See Tom Simonite, Alexa Gives Amazon a Powerful Data Advantage, MIT TECH. REV. 
(Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/603380/alexa-gives-amazon-a-
powerful-data-advantage/ [https://perma.cc/GS83-HCMT]; see also Kelly, supra note 79. 
85 See Antonio Garcia Martinez, No, Data Is Not the New Oil, WIRED (Feb. 26, 2019, 
7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/no-data-is-not-the-new-oil [https://perma.cc/
G6PG-SC32]; see also Kelly, supra note 79. 
86 Technically, data mining refers to the “computational process of discovering patterns 
in large data sets involving methods at the intersection of artificial intelligence, machine 
learning, statistics, Predictive analytics, and database systems,” while data collection refers 
to “the process of gathering and measuring information usually with software.” See Data 
Mining vs Data Collection, IMPORT.IO (Apr. 19, 2014), https://www.import.io/post/data-
mining-vs-data-collection/ [https://perma.cc/AL37-QWCW]. In this Note, data mining and 
data collection are used somewhat interchangeably as the concept of Big Data as employed 
by companies like Amazon incorporates both. 
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the publication of Reverend Thomas Bayes’ An Essay Towards 
Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances, in which he outlined 
a formula that could analyze presented evidence to determine the 
statistical probability of an event’s occurrence.87 Drawing on  
the principles of conditional probability—the relation of current 
probability to prior probability—Bayes’ Theorem described in 
mathematical terms how the likelihood of achieving one’s desired 
hypothesis will be affected by the presentation of certain evidence 
or the knowledge of other probabilities.88 Modern data scientists 
used Bayes’ predictive theorem to form the foundational basis for 
all modern machine learning data mining.89 
Although Bayes’ Theorem had been used by mathematicians for 
over 250 years, it was not until the 1990s that significant advances 
in computer hardware, algorithms, and database technology finally 
allowed data scientists employed by retail and financial industries  
to analyze consumer data and recognize trends that would predict 
fluctuations in interest rates, stock prices, and customer demand, 
thus producing increases in their respective customer bases.90 Built 
upon the data collection processes of the 1960s and the data access 
models of the 1980s, the 1990s version of data mining remained  
entrenched in a retrospective evaluation of the provided data.91 In 
other words, the algorithms could identify trends and patterns in the 
data, but only as a result of what had occurred in the past. Big Data, 
the twenty-first century embodiment of data mining, however, is 
 
87 See Thomas Bayes, An Essay Towards Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances, 
in 53 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS 370, 414 (1763). 
88 See Andrew Ellinor et al., Bayes’ Theorem and Conditional Probability, BRILLIANT, 
https://brilliant.org/wiki/bayes-theorem/ [https://perma.cc/HX9Y-FLPD]; see also Rod 
Pierce, Bayes’ Theorem, MATH IS FUN, https://www.mathsisfun.com/data/bayes-
theorem.html [https://perma.cc/R5LN-ZH6J]. 
89 See Khyati Mahendru, An Introduction to the Powerful Bayes’ Theorem for Data 
Science Professionals, ANALYTICS VIDHYA (June 13, 2019), https://www.analyticsvidhya.
com/blog/2019/06/introduction-powerful-bayes-theorem-data-science/ 
[https://perma.cc/99GR-9WC6]. 
90 See Ray Li, History of Data Mining, HACKER BITS, https://hackerbits.com/ 
data/history-of-data-mining/ [https://perma.cc/9YC2-HURV]. 
91 See The History of Data Mining: Big Data, EXASTAX BLOG (Jan. 20, 2017), 
https://www.exastax.com/big-data/the-history-of-data-mining/ [https://perma.cc/T5EJ-
9U2S]. 
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prospective.92 It combines artificial intelligence and machine learn-
ing with data science and database theory to deliver comprehensive 
predictive analytics.93 Put another way, today’s data mining capa-
bilities allow companies like Amazon to collect information that a 
consumer shares in the present and analyze the information in order 
to anticipate how that same consumer will act in the future.94 
For Amazon, the use of Big Data translates into big profits.95 
Although the specifics behind Amazon’s algorithms and analytics 
remain opaque, safeguarded behind the black box of proprietary 
trade secret information, the general concept driving its data collec-
tion is well known.96 “We see our customers as invited guests to  
a party, and we are the hosts. It’s our job every day to make every 
important aspect of the customer experience a little bit better,”  
asserts CEO Jeff Bezos.97 Bezos’s desire to make life “better” for 
his customers translates into ensuring that a customer’s transaction 
of goods and services through Amazon’s sites and products remains 
both seamless and effortless.98 To accomplish this, Amazon collects 
and stores copious amounts of data about its customers.99 It then 
takes the collected data, analyzes it through proprietary algorithms, 
and generates predictive suggestions for products and services that 
each user might be inclined to purchase.100 By employing targeted 
 
92 “Big data analytics is the use of advanced analytic techniques against very large, 
diverse data sets . . . . [B]ig data comes from sensors, devices, video/audio, networks, log 
files, transactional applications, web, and social media—much of it generated in real time 
and at a very large scale.” Big Data Analytics, IBM, https://www.ibm.com/analytics/
hadoop/big-data-analytics [https://perma.cc/M2FA-J7YH]. 
93 See The History of Data Mining: Big Data, supra note 91. 
94 See Alexander Furnas, Everything You Wanted to Know About Data Mining but Were 
Afraid to Ask, ATLANTIC (Apr. 3, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/
archive/2012/04/everything-you-wanted-to-know-about-data-mining-but-were-afraid-to-
ask/255388/ [https://perma.cc/VTS2-HXHY]. 
95 See Jon Markman, Amazon Using AI, Big Data to Accelerate Profits, FORBES (June 
5, 2017, 9:39 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jonmarkman/2017/06/05/amazon-using-
ai-big-data-to-accelerate-profits/#285c503a6d55 [https://perma.cc/V6GT-2X7P]. 
96 See Furnas, supra note 94. 
97 Robert Binns, Amazon CRM Case Study, EXPERT MKT., https://www.expert
market.co.uk/crm-systems/amazon-crm-case-study [https://perma.cc/E65V-3K7W]. 
98 See id. 
99 See Lou Carlozo, How Online Retailers Collect & Use Consumer Data, DEALNEWS 
(Dec. 23, 2013), https://www.dealnews.com/features/How-Online-Retailers-Collect-Use-
Consumer-Data/938928.html [https://perma.cc/8RPZ-KKGS]. 
100 See id. 
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advertising, utilizing content-specific upsells, and offering incen-
tives such as Prime’s free shipping, Amazon creates the perfect  
conditions to encourage and facilitate the completion of that pur-
chase.101 It is by purposeful design that Amazon endeavors to keep 
its users within its own ecosystem.102 
D. The Harm of the Digital Dossier 
The behaviorally tailored, predictive concierge experience that 
Amazon promises through Alexa requires the extraction of vast 
amounts of information from its users. Each encounter or  
“Interaction”103 with a user helps Alexa to learn more about her  
subject. Because Alexa is voice-activated rather than text-based, the 
data recorded from Interactions provides Amazon with more than 
just digital bytes of information—it offers a user’s context and  
intent.104 Additionally, the placement of Alexa inside a private  
environment such as a home affects the quality of information to 
which the smart assistance is privy. Home users, viewing Alexa as 
a friend or confidante, feel extremely comfortable willingly105  
disclosing personal, sensitive, and sometimes even confidential  
information in her presence.106 However, Alexa is neither a friend 
nor a confidante, but rather a sophisticated learning center whose 
main goal is to siphon information from her users for Amazon’s 
gain. None of the information recorded is kept in confidence.107 All 
 
101 See Minda Zetlin, Here’s How Amazon Gets You to Buy More Stuff, INC. (June 29, 
2017), https://www.inc.com/minda-zetlin/heres-how-amazon-gets-you-to-buy-more-
stuff.html [https://perma.cc/3J34-2QWZ]. 
102 See Kelly, supra note 79. 
103 See Alexa Terms of Use, AMAZON, https://amzn.to/2FEchq5 [https://perma.cc/RX9J-
P3J7]. “Interactions” is an Amazon-coined term for communiqués between Alexa and her 
subject. Id.  
104 See Sarah Vizard, Amazon Reveals How It Thinks About Advertising, MARKETING 
WK. (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.marketingweek.com/2017/09/15/amazon-reveals-
advertising/ [https://perma.cc/29BM-LP84]. 
105 See Alexa Terms of Use, supra note 103. 
106 See, e.g., Calvin, supra note 69 (citing various examples of users who treat Alexa as 
a friend or confidante). 
107 See Kate O’Flaherty, Amazon Staff Are Listening to Alexa Conversations, FORBES 
(Apr. 12, 2019, 11:54 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kateoflahertyuk/2019/04/12/
amazon-staff-are-listening-to-alexa-conversations-heres-what-to-do/#3a571b3671a2 
[https://perma.cc/QY6H-6CX4] (explaining that Amazon’s workers listen to the 
recordings and that experts have expressed that smart speakers are unsecured). 
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of the information gets transported over the internet back to Ama-
zon’s servers to be stored, manipulated, and re-purposed as Amazon 
sees fit.108 
To be fair, the raw data that Amazon collects via Alexa has little 
to no value on its own. Amazon only derives value from the data 
once it is analyzed and synthesized by Amazon’s algorithms  
to extract and produce secondary data sets that Amazon can then  
employ to more accurately predict the actions of its consumers.109 
This generated, proprietary data—what Harvard economist  
Shoshana Zuboff terms “behavioral surplus”110—is stored  
in perpetuity111 within personalized digital dossiers112 on Amazon’s 
servers.113 The subsequent use (or abuse) of this behavioral surplus 
drives surveillance capitalism,114 creating and fostering a co- 
dependent and often exploitative relationship between data subjects 
and data brokers.115 
 
108 See Jennifer Pattison Tuohy & Hugh Langley, Smart Home Privacy: What Amazon, 
Google and Apple Do with Your Data, AMBIENT (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.the-
ambient.com/features/how-amazon-google-apple-use-smart-speaker-data-338 
[https://perma.cc/29WB-L8TK]. 
109 See Data Is Giving Rise to a New Economy, ECONOMIST (May 6, 2017), 
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2017/05/06/data-is-giving-rise-to-a-new-economy 
[https://perma.cc/L9MM-GLGF] (explaining that data centers extract value from raw 
digital information). 
110 See John Naughton, Welcome to the Age of Surveillance Capitalism, GUARDIAN (Jan. 
20, 2019, 2:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jan/20/shoshana-
zuboff-age-of-surveillance-capitalism-google-facebook [https://perma.cc/Z5NC-G9CU]. 
111 See Alexa, Echo Devices, and Your Privacy, AMAZON, https://amzn.to/2YkU3kE 
[https://perma.cc/D6NN-NBEF]. But see Allison, supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
112 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY & PRIVACY IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE 1 (2004) (the term “digital dossier” is borrowed from this text). 
113 See Where Does Amazon’s Alexa Pull Data From?, PROTECT AM.: HOME SECURITY 
BLOG (Dec. 23, 2017), https://www.protectamerica.com/home-security-blog/tech-tips/
where-does-amazon-s-alexa-pull-data-from_15724 [https://perma.cc/E8RJ-KYGU]. 
114 Surveillance capitalism refers to “selling access to the real-time flow of your daily 
life—your reality—in order to directly influence and modify your behavior for profit.” 
Shoshana Zuboff, The Secrets of Surveillance Capitalism, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE 
(May 3, 2016, 1:23 PM), https://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/debatten/the-digital-
debate/shoshana-zuboff-secrets-of-surveillance-capitalism-14103616.html 
[https://perma.cc/Z5N9-VYJJ]. For a more in-depth explanation and exploration of the 
phenomenon and its impact on privacy today, see generally SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE 
OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF 
POWER (2019). 
115 See Naughton, supra note 110. 
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To be clear, the fact that Amazon collects information on its  
consumers—especially information provided with informed  
consent116—is not in and of itself harmful.117 Further, Amazon’s 
subsequent synthesis and analysis of the collected data does not sug-
gest that the company has an inherent malicious or injurious intent 
toward its consumers. However, Amazon’s massive aggregation and 
perpetual storage of its users’ personal data, which is segmented into 
individualized digital dossiers and algorithmically employed to  
anticipate or influence the behavioral patterns of customers—all of 
which occurs in the absence of regulation—raises extreme concerns 
over the integrity and security of individuals’ data privacy. 
Data companies such as Amazon lure customers with the  
promise of convenience in exchange for an illusion of trust.118 They 
ask that individual consumers trust them to allow for the installation 
of surveillance equipment and software into their most intimate 
spheres, such as the home. They ask that individuals trust them to 
effectively secure collected data, maintain its integrity, and employ 
the proceeds in the best interest of the consumer only. At no point 
do these companies substantively or legally define the parameters 
(or, quite frankly, even the meaning) of this implied trust, and rarely, 
if ever, do these companies reciprocate it.119 Instead, companies hide 
 
116 See Alexa Terms of Use, supra note 103. 
117 See, e.g., Mark Sullivan, Actually, I Want to Hand Over Even More of My Personal 
Data to Big Tech, FAST COMPANY (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90315
789/actually-i-want-to-hand-over-even-more-of-my-data-to-big-tech [https://perma.cc/
KE86-7Y7L] (arguing that there are benefits that can be derived from providing Big Tech 
personal data—i.e., “proactively remov[ing] the mundanities and friction points of 
everyday life, and know[ing] what I need practically before I do”). 
118 See Alexa, Echo Devices, and Your Privacy, supra note 111 (“Amazon knows that 
you care how information about you is used, and we appreciate your trust that we will do 
so carefully and sensibly.”). (emphasis added). 
119 See, e.g., Warwick Ashford, Uber Recognises Need for Consumer Trust After Breach 
Cover Up, COMPUTERWEEKLY (Nov. 22, 2017, 10:30 AM), https://www.computer
weekly.com/news/450430525/Uber-recognises-need-for-consumer-trust-after-breach-
cover-up [https://perma.cc/7DD9-3FXT] (detailing how Uber covered up a customer data 
breach); Carly Page, Amazon Suffers Data Breach but Remains Tight-Lipped on Details, 
INQUIRER (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/3066757/amazon-
data-breach-2018-black-friday [https://perma.cc/8DJ9-J2X3] (suggesting that there was 
more to the data breach than Amazon disclosed to its customers); Natasha Singer, What 
You Don’t Know About How Facebook Uses Your Data, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/11/technology/facebook-privacy-hearings.html 
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behind the impenetrable black box of algorithms and trade secrets 
to prevent individuals from knowing or understanding how their 
data is being processed, stored, and used (or reused).120 
Absent comprehensive federal data privacy legislation to  
uniformly regulate the collection, storage, and manipulation of  
customer data, the only glue holding the current U.S. paradigm  
together is the illusive idea of trust that exists between the data  
consumer and the data collector. Professor Jack Balkin has  
embraced this notion of trust to advocate for a new regulatory model 
in which data collectors function as “information fiduciaries” on  
behalf of their consumers.121 Drawing upon the tenets of agency law, 
Balkin argues that in the Digital Information Age where consumers 
have entrusted technology companies with their private data, those 
companies should be held to the same legal obligations as doctors 
or lawyers to act as fiduciaries and uphold the duties of care,  
confidentiality, and loyalty to use collected information in the best 
interest of the consumer only.122 In this way, the illusion of trust that 
has been falsely established may continue unabated, but the  
consumer can rest easy knowing her data will be protected. 
Mere trust alone, however, cannot shoulder the incredible bur-
den of ensuring that data brokers such as Amazon will not abuse or 
breach the implied duties of confidentiality and loyalty owed to and 
expected by their users; mere trust alone cannot provide a remedy to 
 
[https://perma.cc/N8UL-CEE6] (explaining how Facebook employed user data without 
consent). 
120 See Tim Wu, An American Alternative to Europe’s Privacy Law, N.Y. TIMES (May 
30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/30/opinion/europe-america-privacy-gdpr. 
html [https://perma.cc/UF7T-6N43] (explaining how companies like Amazon hold 
themselves as trustworthy yet fail to be transparent with their consumers about their data 
practices). 
121 See Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 1183, 1186 (2016); see also Jack M. Balkin & Jonathan Zittrain, A Grand Bargain 
to Make Tech Companies Trustworthy, ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.
com/technology/archive/2016/10/information-fiduciary/502346/ [https://perma.cc/6A47-
JKCD]. 
122 See Balkin, supra note 121, at 1201, 1226. 
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an individual when one’s data is breached,123 misappropriated,124 or 
employed in a manner that inflicts harm.125 Further, as Lina Kahn 
and David Pozen recently articulated in their pushback to Balkin’s 
information fiduciary theory, a user’s trust in data collectors to han-
dle their information with loyalty, confidentiality or care is wholly 
misplaced.126 The end game of tech companies is profit; information 
equals profit, and current corporate law forbids putting the user’s 
privacy needs ahead of the shareholder’s bottom line.127 As such, 
Big Tech companies such as Amazon will continue to push the 
boundaries of acceptable privacy norms, and it is only a matter of 
time before those boundaries will cease to be an effective bulwark 
from harm. As the tentacles of Big Data and Big Tech continue to 
embed themselves within the innermost sanctums of users’ lives, it 
is imperative that the United States establishes an efficient legal 
framework to effectively regulate data collectors and to protect the 
personal data privacy interests of the consumer. 
II. THE CURRENT U.S. PRIVACY FRAMEWORK: A SECTORAL 
REGIME RELIANT ON FIPPS, NOTICE AND CHOICE, AND THE FTC 
A. A Difference in Approach: Comprehensive vs. Sectoral 
When it comes to protecting the data privacy interests of the  
individual, the United States has long trailed behind its European 
 
123 See Glenn Fleishman, Equifax Data Breach, One Year Later, FORTUNE (Sept. 7, 
2018), http://fortune.com/2018/09/07/equifax-data-breach-one-year-anniversary/ 
[https://perma.cc/LU8P-SJWQ]; see also Lily Hay Newman, Equifax Officially Has No 
Excuse, WIRED (Sept. 14, 2017, 1:27 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/equifax-breach-
no-excuse/ [https://perma.cc/9LYJ-UZFF]. 
124 See Robinson Meyer, The Cambridge Analytica Scandal, in Three Paragraphs, 
ATLANTIC (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/03/the-
cambridge-analytica-scandal-in-three-paragraphs/556046/ [https://perma.cc/ZNU3-
C5E3]. 
125 See Kashmir Hill, How Target Figured Out a Teen Girl Was Pregnant Before Her 
Father Did, FORBES (Feb. 16, 2012, 11:02 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/
2012/02/16/how-target-figured-out-a-teen-girl-was-pregnant-before-her-father-did/#3b57
679b6668 [https://perma.cc/5ZEB-FKFS] (explaining how Target used consumer data to 
determine a woman was pregnant before she had informed her family). 
126 See Lina M. Kahn & David E. Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries, 
HARV. L. REV.  (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 1) (on file with author).  
127 See id. at 6–10. 
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counterparts.128 In large part, this is a result of intrinsic differences 
in the philosophies underlying the conceptions of personal and  
data privacy and the ways in which government should endeavor  
to oversee and regulate its protection. Having borne witness to  
the extermination of entire populations based on the whims of  
tyrannical regimes,129 many countries within the EU vehemently 
protect individual privacy as a fundamental human right.130 This 
freedom has since been codified in the EU Charter, which recog-
nizes a right to privacy in one’s personal data131 as well as a “right 
to the respect of privacy” within one’s home.132 
In contrast, the United States, a country founded on the celebra-
tion of the individual and freedom of expression,133 conceives of 
data as a personal and commercial asset134 and privacy as a personal, 
autonomous choice.135 Although the courts have inferred a general 
right to privacy in various amendments,136 nowhere in the text of the 
 
128 See Thomas Holt, Data Privacy Rules in the EU May Leave the U.S. Behind, GOV’T. 
TECH. (Jan. 24, 2019), http://www.govtech.com/computing/Data-Privacy-Rules-in-the-
EU-May-Leave-the-US-Behind.html [https://perma.cc/HXM8-DV3C]. 
129 See Olivia B. Waxman, The GDPR Is Just the Latest Example of Europe’s Caution 
on Privacy Rights. That Outlook Has a Disturbing History, TIME (May 24, 2018), 
https://time.com/5290043/nazi-history-eu-data-privacy-gdpr/ [https://perma.cc/54F3-
5NXZ] (positing that Nazi Germany and the Stasi’s misuse of compiled personal data for 
heinous crimes has led to Europe’s protective stance on privacy). 
130 See Mark Scott & Natasha Singer, How Europe Protects Your Online Data Differently 
Than the U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/01/
29/technology/data-privacy-policy-us-europe.html [https://perma.cc/L7Y3-PN94]. 
131 See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 8, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 
O.J. (C 326) 391, 397 [hereinafter Charter of Fundamental Rights]. 
132 See id. art. 7, at 397. 
133 See Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP, GDPR: How Is It Different from U.S. Law & Why 
This Matters?, LEXOLOGY BLOG (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g=4b2843f7-f67a-4015-bca9-96bd2fe344c9 [https://perma.cc/F23W-TLYN]. 
134 See Andrada Coos, EU v US: How Do Their Data Privacy Regulations Square Off?, 
ENDPOINT PROTECTOR BLOG (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.endpointprotector.com/blog/eu-
vs-us-how-do-their-data-protection-regulations-square-off/ [https://perma.cc/YY9W-
AFGJ]. 
135 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 23, at 198 (arguing that the law “secures to each 
individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and 
emotions shall be communicated to others”). 
136 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–486 (1965) (inferring from the 
Fourteenth Amendment a right of marital privacy which should be protected against state 
restrictions on contraception); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) 
(establishing within the Fourth Amendment the concept of a subjective expectation of 
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Constitution is such freedom explicitly guaranteed or safeguarded. 
Instead, the choice to maintain personal privacy receives limited 
constitutional and statutory protection from governmental  
intrusion137 and relegates violations by private entities to the law of 
tort, contract, and other civil causes of action.138 As Joel R. 
Reidenberg, a privacy expert at Fordham University School of Law, 
has observed, “In Europe the first line of defense against private 
wrongdoing is the state. In the U.S. our instinct is more liberal: Let 
private actors sue each other.”139 
The philosophical distinctions in privacy between the United 
States and the EU may also be evidenced in the current regulatory 
frameworks governing each. In May 2018, the EU enacted the  
General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”), an omnibus privacy 
legislation that comprehensively applies one unified code to all 
twenty-eight member states.140 The GDPR imbues the individual 
with the power to control and regulate the collection, storage, and 
manipulation of his own personal information.141 Acting as a  
privacy “bill of rights,” the GDPR provides an individual with the 
right to know what types of information a business collects on him, 
to access the collected information, to rectify errors in the collected 
information, to withdraw consent at any time for the collection of 
such information, to object to the processing (or automated pro-
cessing) of personal data, to port data, and to have any collected data 
permanently erased.142 
 
privacy); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (finding 
unconstitutional a housing ordinance that invaded the privacy of an extended family’s 
living arrangement). 
137 See supra Section I.A. 
138 See Richards & Solove, supra note 39, at 1918 (explaining the failure of the privacy 
torts to protect against the intrusion of the media or adapt to new privacy problems such as 
the collection of private data by businesses). 
139 Bob Sullivan, ‘La Difference’ Is Stark in EU, U.S. Privacy Laws, NBC NEWS (Oct. 
19, 2006), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/15221111/ns/technology_and_science-privacy_
lost/t/la-difference-stark-eu-us-privacy-laws/ [https://perma.cc/E575-PM2T]. 
140 See generally Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC 
(General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 [hereinafter GDPR]. 
141 See id. 
142 See id. ch. 3, arts. 15–22, at 43–46. 
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More than a mere piece of legislation, however, the GDPR rep-
resents a marked shift in the ethos and privacy norms that emerged 
in the E.U. post-9/11.143 With the increased state surveillance  
following the attacks, individuals were particularly wary of disclos-
ing information without providing explicit consent.144 One of the 
aims of the GDPR was to rebuild consumer trust in sharing infor-
mation with private companies.145 Another aim of the GDPR was  
to limit the predatory practices of businesses.146 “Data should not be 
kept simply because storage is cheap. Data should not be processed 
simply because algorithms are refined. Safeguards should apply,  
and citizens should have rights,” declared EU Vice President  
and Justice Commissioner, Viviane Reding, during a 2014 European 
Data Protection Day celebration.147 The aspirational principles that  
Reding has espoused in her speeches—consent, data minimization, 
purpose limitation, and confidentiality—are the same guiding  
principles that underscore and permeate the various facets of  
the GDPR.148 
Consent forms one of the guiding cornerstones upon which the 
GDPR was built.149 Before an individual’s data may be collected, 
stored, or used, the company requesting the data must receive  
affirmative consent—unambiguously and voluntarily given—from 
the individual to do so, and such consent may be revoked at any 
time.150 Data minimization requires that data processors151  
 
143 See Trevor Butterworth, Europe’s Tough New Digital Privacy Law Should Be a Model 
for US Policymakers, VOX (May 23, 2018, 6:45 AM), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/
2018/3/26/17164022/gdpr-europe-privacy-rules-facebook-data-protection-eu-cambridge 
[https://perma.cc/3XAY-BCL5]. 
144 See Viviane Reding, Vice-President, Eur. Comm’n, EU Justice Comm’r, Speech: A 
Data Protection Compact for Europe, (Jan. 28, 2014), available at http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-62_en.htm [https://perma.cc/6GFS-2M4D]. 
145 See Viviane Reding, Vice-President, Eur. Comm’n, EU Just. Comm’r, Speech: The 
EU Data Protection Reform: Helping Businesses Thrive in The Digital Economy, (Jan. 19, 
2014), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-37_en.htm 
[https://perma.cc/75XF-M4MZ]. 
146 See id. 
147 Reding, supra note 145; see also Butterworth, supra note 144. 
148 See generally GDPR, supra note 141, art. 5, at 35–36. 
149 See generally id. art. 7, at 37. 
150 See id. art. 7(3), at 37. 
151 Under the GDPR, “‘processor’ means a natural or legal person, public authority, 
agency or other body which processes personal data on behalf of the controller.” A 
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employ only as much data as is directly relevant and necessary to 
successfully accomplish a given task.152 Moreover, any data col-
lected must be limited to a one-purpose use and may not be  
repurposed without the express consent of the individual.153  
Companies are further required to maintain the integrity and  
confidentiality of all collected data154 and to limit the length of time 
for which any personal data is stored.155 
The comprehensive nature of the GDPR’s regulation ensures 
continuity and cohesiveness in its application and enforcement 
across all EU member states for individual data and privacy protec-
tion. In upgrading from the aspirational guidance of the Data  
Protection Directive156 to the mandatory and binding regulation of 
the GDPR, the EU signaled its commitment not only to protect  
individual data privacy, but also to establish itself as the de facto 
international standard for data privacy protection. 
Eschewing the one-size-fits-all approach adopted by the EU and 
the GDPR, the United States, in contrast, has historically favored a 
sector-specific (sectoral) approach to privacy regulation, in which 
governmental interference is minimal, and the various industrial 
marketplace stakeholders dictate and determine internal oversight 
and governance on an as-needed basis.157 The United States’ laissez 
faire attitude toward privacy has resulted in the adoption of ad hoc 
statutory regulations passed only when exigent circumstances  
demand.158 For example, in response to consumer outrage over the 
 
“controller” is defined as “the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other 
body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the 
processing of personal data.” Id. art. 4(7)–(8), at 33. 
152 See id. art. 5(1)(c), at 35. 
153 See id. art. 5(1)(b), at 35. 
154 See id. art. 5(1)(f), at 36. 
155 See id. art. 5(1)(e), at 36. 
156 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 
on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the 
Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 23. 
157 See Daniel Solove, The Growing Problems with the Sectoral Approach to Privacy 
Law, TEACHPRIVACY: PRIVACY + SECURITY BLOG (Nov. 13, 2015), https://teach
privacy.com/problems-sectoral-approach-privacy-law/ [https://perma.cc/3YDS-SY64]. 
158 See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-191, 10 Stat. 1936 (1996) (“HIPAA”), which regulates how PII is maintained by the 
healthcare and insurance industries; Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 
113 Stat. 1338 (1999), which governs the collection and disclosure of customers’ personal 
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rampant lack of transparency by credit companies who provided 
consumer data used to determine credit eligibility, Congress passed 
the Fair Credit Reporting Act,159 which regulates the collection of 
credit information and access to credit reports.160 Similarly, after  
Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork’s video tape rental history was 
disclosed to a reporter during the nomination proceedings, the 
Washington, D.C. elite galvanized to pressure Congress to rapidly 
pass the Video Privacy Protection Act,161 which creates liability  
for the “wrongful disclosure of video tape rental or sale records.162 
This fractured approach to regulation creates inconsistencies and  
irregularities among the various sectors.163 Unlike the EU, the 
United States does not uniformly regulate or protect individual data 
privacy. Instead, each policy is based on the type of data collected 
and the entity responsible for aggregating and maintaining that  
collected data.164 This overlapping patchwork of legislation has  
created confusion and contradictions for the consumer who acts as 
a data supplier, as well as the various entities that act as information 
and data collectors.165 
B. The FIPPs 
In the early 1970s, the development and incorporation of  
computer systems into the workplace led to technological advances 
in the collection and retention of personal data. Concerned about the 
potential for abuse of these new methods, the Secretary’s Advisory 
 
financial information by financial institutions; Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered section of 18 
U.S.C.), which addresses voluntary and compelled disclosure of “stored wire and electronic 
communications and transactional records” held by third-party Internet service providers. 
159 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2018). 
160 See FED. TRADE COMM’N., DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY (May 2014). 
161 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2018). 
162 See Stephen Advokat, Publication of Bork’s Video Rentals Raises Privacy Issues, CHI. 
TRIB. (Nov. 20, 1987), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1987-11-20-87032
70590-story.html [https://perma.cc/2NPA-M957]. 
163 See Solove, supra note 158. 
164 See Solove, supra note 158. 
165 For a more detailed explanation of the confusion that the U.S. privacy statutory 
scheme creates, see Nuala O’Connor, Reforming the U.S. Approach to Data Protection and 
Privacy, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/report/reforming-
us-approach-data-protection [https://perma.cc/ES6K-5DAQ]. 
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Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems, under the direc-
tion of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (“HEW”), 
supervised a study on record-keeping practices in the computer age, 
focusing on both government and business (the “HEW Report”).166 
The committee recognized the harmful impact that unwanted  
disclosure of identifiable information might have on individuals and 
the protection of their personal privacy.167 The committee’s findings 
instigated the passage of both the Privacy Act of 1974,168 which  
regulated the use of personal information by U.S. governmental 
agencies, and the OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and 
Transborder Flows of Personal Data (1980), which established  
international guidelines to facilitate the free flow of information  
between countries while simultaneously protecting personal data. 
Arguably, however, one of the most impactful and lasting  
elements of the HEW report was the development of the Fair  
Information Practice Principles (“FIPPs”). The committee outlined 
five major principles169—transparency, use limitation, access and 
correction, data quality, and security—that should constitute a  
“minimum set of rights” available to the individual.170 Broadly, 
these principles delineated an aspirational paradigm to address 
global concerns about the protection of individual data privacy 
within the ever-evolving technological landscape that threatened to 
erode it. The FIPPs further empowered individuals to actively  
participate in the collection and retention of their personal data.171 
Unfortunately, as adopted and implemented by U.S. law and  
the Federal Trade Commission in the 1990s, the broad idealistic 
principles of FIPPs were reduced to two narrow legal tenets, which 
serve as the backbone for the self-regulatory regime that  
 
166 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, DHEW PUB. NO. (OS) 73-94, 
SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS, 
RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS ix (1973) [hereinafter HEW REPORT]. 
167 Id.  
168 Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1974). 
169 See HEW REPORT, supra note 167, at xx. 
170 See HEW REPORT, supra note 167, at xxi. 
171 See Fred H. Cate, The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, in CONSUMER 
PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE INFORMATION ECONOMY 341, 341–345 (Jane K. Winn ed., 
2006). 
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dominates and protects the titans of the private sector: (1) notice  
and (2) choice.172 
C. Notice and Choice 
“Notice” implies transparency. It suggests that prior to gathering 
personal info, a data collection entity must only identify what  
information is being collected, how the collected information will 
be used, and whether any third parties might also obtain access to 
the collected information.173 Traditionally the principle of notice has 
manifested itself through a company’s privacy policy.174 “Choice” 
has become synonymous with consent. It affords a user the oppor-
tunity to “opt-in” if one agrees to a company’s proposed privacy  
terms. The “choice” element mainly manifests itself as the “agree”  
button that appears alongside the Terms of Service notifications 
prior to the download of apps, the entrance to a website, or the  
installation of software. 
Supporters of “notice and choice” applaud the regime for its 
preservation of individual autonomy—it puts individuals in charge 
of decisions regarding the use and dissemination of their personal 
data.175 The regime encourages users to be the arbiters of what is 
good or bad for them, without imposing further restrictions on others 
or the marketplace as a whole.176 Professor Ryan Calo argues that 
this type of informed consent “furnishes consumers with infor-
mation they would not otherwise have so that they can protect them-
selves and police the market.”177 Critics of “notice and choice,” 
however, fault the regime as illusory, inadequate, and ineffectual.178 
Rather than empower individual autonomy, notice and choice  
anesthetizes and overwhelms, renders rational decision-making 
 
172 See id. at 355–56. 
173 See Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Disagreeable Privacy Policies: Mismatches Between 
Meaning and Users’ Understanding, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 39, 44 (2015) [hereinafter 
Reidenberg et al., Disagreeable Privacy Policies]. 
174 See WALDMAN, supra note 9, at 82. 
175 See M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1027, 1049 (2012). 
176 See id. at 1028. 
177 Id. at 1044. 
178 See generally Cate, supra note 172. 
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meaningless,179 and ultimately fails to address the real underlying 
issues of privacy and harm that the system was originally designed 
to remedy. 
For notice to be effective, individuals must be able to read and 
understand the stated policies of the entities seeking to collect  
personal data. However, in today’s world, where the sectoral regime 
encourages a lack of uniformity across data collection platforms, 
and almost all information flows are controlled by third parties, the 
achievement of true notice seems overwhelming, if not impossible. 
Lorrie Faith Cranor, director of the Carnegie Mellon Usable Privacy 
and Security Laboratory, estimates that in order for individuals to 
actually read through all the terms and conditions that are presented 
to them by third parties each year, they would have to devote  
between 180 to 300 hours a year, which roughly translates to  
dedicating about forty minutes each day.180 Amazon’s terms and 
conditions alone would take approximately nine hours to digest.181 
Because of the sheer effort involved to accomplish the task, few, if 
any, consumers ever read the relevant privacy policies posted by 
collectors of personal data, thereby rendering ineffective the concept 
of notice. 
Even if an individual were to read each presented policy, it is 
unlikely that he or she would be able to fully comprehend its  
contents, so as to make the giving of consent—or choice—a truly 
informed decision.182 Although several states have passed  
 
179 See WALDMAN, supra note 9, at 84. 
180 See Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy 
Policies, 4 I/S 543, 563 (2008). 
181 See Editorial, How Silicon Valley Puts the ‘Con’ in Consent, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/02/opinion/internet-facebook-google-consent.
html [https://perma.cc/Y4WC-8Z7S]. 
182 See Most People Just Click and Accept Privacy Policies Without Reading Them—You 
Might Be Surprised at What They Allow Companies to Do, NBR (Feb. 7, 2019), 
http://nbr.com/2019/02/07/most-people-just-click-and-accept-privacy-policies-without-
reading-them-you-might-be-surprised-at-what-they-allow-companies-to-do/ 
[https://perma.cc/HS66-FGXX] (quoting Brian Vecci, the field chief technology officer for 
Varonis, a cybersecurity company that focuses on securing data: “[Privacy policies are] not 
designed for consumers, for you and me, to understand. They’re written by lawyers for 
lawyers to protect the company”); see also Aaron Smith, Half of Online Americans Don’t 
Know What a Privacy Policy Is, PEW RES. CTR.: FACTTANK (Dec. 4, 2014), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/04/half-of-americans-dont-know-what-a-
privacy-policy-is/ [https://perma.cc/959Q-SZ6D] (quoting Joseph Turow, Professor of 
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legislation to require that companies write their online privacy  
policies in clear, precise, and non-legal language in order to help 
consumers better understand the scope of the information collected, 
such standardization has not been uniformly adopted nor federally  
mandated.183 As a result, most companies pay lip service to satisfy 
the principle of “notice” by writing their policies in dense  
legalese,184 with vague and ambiguous185 language that obfuscates 
the true nature of the information being amassed and often forces 
individuals to consent to the collection of more data than necessary 
to accomplish a required task.186 Thus, a vicious cycle ensues:  
company failures to adequately notify lead to consumer failures to 
properly choose. 
Choice in today’s oversaturated online market is not only  
illusory but often impossible. Choice should represent “giving  
consumers options as to how any personal information collected 
from them may be used.”187 However, because privacy policies are 
one-size-fits-all, and in practice cannot be tailored, altered, or  
user-customized, the once-empowering concept of autonomous 
choice has been essentially reduced to “choosing” between de facto 
acceptance of the stated terms or complete forfeiture of the use of 
the desired app, website, or software. 
 
Communications and scholar of digital marketing and privacy issues at the University of 
Pennsylvania’s Annenberg School for Communication: “Many people don’t actually read 
privacy policies; they simply look at the label.  . . . And the intuitive understanding—the 
cultural understanding—of the label is that when something says ‘privacy policy,’ it 
protects your privacy”). 
183 See, e.g., California Online Privacy Protection Act, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 
22575–22579 (2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42–471 (2017) (limited to businesses who 
collect Social Security numbers); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1205C (2015); NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 603A.340 (2017). 
184 See Alan Henry, Useable Privacy Shows You What Privacy Policies Actually Mean, 
in Plain English, LIFEHACKER (Mar. 20, 2016, 2:00 PM), https://lifehacker.com/usable-
privacy-shows-you-what-privacy-policies-actually-1764431489 [https://perma.cc/J8XB-
M25Y]; see also Joseph Turow & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, The FTC and Consumer Privacy 
in the Coming Decade, 3 I/S 723, 731 (2006). 
185 See Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Ambiguity in Privacy Polices and the Impact of 
Regulation, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. S163, S163–64 (2016). 
186 See Reidenberg et al., Disagreeable Privacy Policies, supra note 174, at 46. 
187 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 8 (1998) [hereinafter 
FTC 1998 REPORT]. 
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D. The FTC: The De Facto Privacy Regulator 
Despite the publication of the HEW Report, the passage of the 
Privacy Act of 1974, and the decades-long warnings by consumer 
advocate groups of the potential for abuse of computerized record 
keeping, Congress has never created or even officially delegated 
oversight of consumer data privacy to any federal agency. Following 
a congressional invitation to investigate privacy risks posed by  
computer databases in the late 1990s, however, the FTC essentially 
volunteered to assume the watchdog mantle, and, over the past two 
decades, has steadily emerged as the country’s de facto consumer 
privacy regulator.188 
The FTC’s effectiveness in regulating consumer privacy,  
however, has been hotly debated. Champions of the agency’s  
efficacy hail its regulatory influence as “formidable.”189 Critics  
rebuke it as “toothless.”190 The reality lies somewhere in between. 
While the agency has made great strides in establishing an oversight  
regime where none previously existed, limits to its (1) chosen scope 
of enforcement, (2) statutory powers, and (3) physical capacity have 
ultimately diminished the FTC’s ability to efficiently address and 
effectively curtail the onslaught of privacy concerns emerging from 
today’s rapidly expanding and innovative tech sector. 
The FTC derives its consumer regulatory authority from Section 
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (the “Act” or “FTC Act”).191 
Under the Act, the FTC has the power to investigate and resolve 
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce,”192 
with prosecution possible through both administrative and judicial 
proceedings.193 Like most federal agencies, the FTC technically has 
 
188 For an in-depth look at how the FTC emerged as the privacy regulator, see generally 
Steven Hetcher, The De Facto Federal Privacy Commission, 19 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER 
& INFO. L. 109 (2000). 
189 See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of 
Privacy, 114 COL. L. REV. 583, 600 (2014). 
190 See Peter Maass, Your FTC Privacy Watchdogs: Low-Tech, Defensive, Toothless, 
WIRED (June 28, 2012, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2012/06/ftc-fail/ 
[https://perma.cc/GU8W-LSFV]. 
191 See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2018). 
192 Id. § 45(a)(1). 
193 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION’S 
INVESTIGATIVE & LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY pt. 2, sec. A. (July 2008). 
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the ability to conduct oversight through adjudication194 and rule-
making.195 However, the passage of the Magnuson–Moss Act196 and 
the FTC Improvements Act of 1980197 significantly curtailed the 
agency’s ability to conduct oversight through rulemaking.198 As a 
result, the agency has declined to promulgate comprehensive  
privacy-specific trade regulations, opting instead to monitor the  
private sector almost entirely through ad hoc adjudications.199 While 
this case-specific process allows for flexibility and adaptability amid 
a rapidly expanding technological sector,200 it ultimately limits the 
reach and sector-wide effectiveness of the FTC’s oversight. Ad hoc 
adjudication commences only after a violation has occurred, 
whereas rulemaking can act prophylactically by proscribing  
violative behavior before it transpires. 
The FTC is further limited by its statutory inability to  
proactively levy fines on businesses. Per Section 5 of the FTC Act, 
the FTC may only impose monetary sanctions on a business for  
violating an FTC cease and desist order or an FTC consent decree.201 
Substantially, this means that before a business will suffer any  
financial consequences for its violative actions, it must first commit 
an offense, be sanctioned by the FTC, agree to settle for that offense, 
and then commit that same offense again in violation of the original 
settlement agreement. This bureaucratic inefficiency allows for  
multiple transgressions to occur before a company has to  
proverbially “pay the piper.” Similar to the issue with adjudications, 
the FTC’s lack of authority to issue civil penalties against a  
 
194 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2018). 
195 See id. § 57(a). 
196 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312 (2018). 
197 Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-52, §§ 7–12, 
94 Stat. 374, 376–80. 
198 See Barry B. Boyer, Executive Summary of Barry B. Boyer Report: Trade Regulation 
Rulemaking Procedures of the Federal Trade Commission, in 1979 ACUS 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 79–1, at 41. 
199 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-52, INTERNET PRIVACY: ADDITIONAL 
FEDERAL AUTHORITY COULD ENHANCE CONSUMER PROTECTION AND PROVIDE FLEXIBILITY 
11 (2019) [hereinafter GAO-19-52]; see also Jeffrey S. Lubbers, It’s Time to Remove the 
“Mossified” Procedures for FTC Rulemaking, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1979, 1989 (2015). 
200 See GAO-19-52, supra note 200, at 25. 
201 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(m) (2018). 
2019] THE CONCEALED COST OF CONVENIENCE 295 
company for its initial violation reduces the agency’s effectiveness 
in deterring harmful actions. 
Section 5 of the FTC Act grants the agency expansive authority 
to protect consumers from deceptive practices or unfair methods of 
competition within the marketplace;202 however, the FTC has 
elected to apply this broad mandate quite narrowly. To combat  
privacy concerns raised by the collection of consumer data in  
the emerging online landscape, the agency has chosen to focus on a  
market-based approach—encouraging “effective self-regulation” 
among private sector businesses rather than promulgating and  
instituting comprehensive sector-wide rules.203 In a series of  
congressional reports issued in the late 1990s, the FTC advocated 
for businesses to employ the “core” FIPPs when designing  
consumers’ informational privacy protections,204 and further main-
tained that these principles should form the basis of any federal  
legislation or regulation involving the control of businesses’ online 
consumer data collection.205 In reality, however, the FTC eschewed 
many of the FIPPs and instead focused its oversight almost  
exclusively on notice (via “privacy policies”) and choice (via  
“opt-in” mechanisms).206 On the one hand, the agency’s actions 
helped to foster the innovation, growth, and expansion of a nascent 
 
202 See id. § 45(a), (n). 
203 FTC 1998 REPORT, supra note 188, at 2. 
204 In 1998 and 1999, the FTC advocated for five principles: (1) Notice/Awareness,  
(2) Choice/Consent, (3) Access/Participation, (4) Integrity/Security, and (5) Enforcement/
Redress. See id.; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, SELF-REGULATION AND PRIVACY ONLINE: 
A REPORT TO CONGRESS 3 (1999) [hereinafter FTC 1999 REPORT]. By 2000, however, the 
FTC had removed Enforcement/Redress as a core principle. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE: A 
REPORT TO CONGRESS iii (2000) [hereinafter FTC 2000 REPORT]. 
205 See FTC 1998 REPORT, supra note 188, at 7; FTC 1999 REPORT, supra note 205, at 3; 
FTC 2000 REPORT, supra note 205, at iii. 
206 According to the FTC, “[n]otice” was the “most fundamental” principle, without 
which the other principles had no real meaning. See FTC 1998 REPORT, supra note 188, at 
7; FTC 1999 REPORT, supra note 205, at 3. Although the reports discussed the principles 
of Access and Security, they left most of their recommendations on that front to the 
discretion of the businesses. “[T]he Commission believes that Access presents unique 
implementation issues that require consideration before its parameters can be defined.” 
FTC 2000 REPORT, supra note 205, at 17. “The Commission believes that Security, like 
Access, presents unique implementation issues and that the security provided by a Web 
site should be ‘adequate’ in light of the costs and benefits.” FTC 2000 REPORT, supra note 
205, at 18. 
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online commercial industry;207 on the other, the FTC’s policies had 
the adverse effect of sanctioning predatory data collection methods 
by those same entities and industries.208 
Further limiting the scope of its regulations, the FTC opts to 
bring most of its enforcement actions under the deceptive rather than 
unfair practices prong of Section 5 because the former is much  
easier to identify and police.209 For the FTC to pursue a practice as 
“unfair,” it must cause or be likely to cause “substantial injury to 
consumers,” and must be one that consumers cannot reasonably 
avoid by other means.210 Further, if a practice is “outweighed by 
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition,” the FTC 
will not deem it unfair.211 Such a caveat establishes a particularly 
high threshold that is difficult to overcome when considering the 
predatory data collection practices that drive the surveillance  
economy. The FTC would prefer to focus on ad hoc adjudication of 
contract law disputes rather than perform the more difficult task of 
proactively promulgating data protection laws. 
The FTC’s almost singular focus on violations of notice and 
choice permits tech companies like Amazon to use their published 
privacy policies as shields against enforcement actions. Tech  
companies give notice and inform consumers of their data collection 
practices, however egregious they may be. In turn, customers rely 
on those same polices to become educated on the substantive level, 
if any, of protection that will be afforded to their personal data.212 
As these policies are readily available in written format, in the event 
that consumer data privacy has been breached, the FTC simply looks 
to see if any discrepancies exist between a data collector’s proffered 
 
207 See GAO-19-52, supra note 200, at 1. 
208 See Turow & Hoofnagle, supra note 185, at 728 (arguing that the omission of  
the principles of “data minimization” and “purpose specification” from the FTC’s 
recommendations has “led firms to collect extraneous information and repurpose 
information without consumer consent”). 
209 See David Lazarus, FTC Is Falling Short in Protecting Consumers’ Data Used by 
Businesses, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2016, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-
lazarus-20160112-column.html [https://perma.cc/T9PM-9T3N]. 
210 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2018). 
211 Id. 
212 See Turow & Hoofnagle, supra note 185, at 744. 
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guidelines and the actions that it has taken.213 Where a company has 
promised to provide protections yet failed to deliver (or delivered  
a lesser degree of) protection and privacy was breached (i.e.,  
“broken promises”),214 the FTC will endeavor to intervene.215 Such  
intervention begins with an inquiry or warning, but more often than 
not, ends in a private settlement or consent decree. Over the past 
decade, the FTC has brought 101 privacy enforcement actions 
against companies, nearly all of which ended in consent decrees.216 
In many cases, the penalties inflicted by these consent decrees are 
so minimal that offending companies simply view them as a cost of 
doing business.217 While such settlements may have an effect  
on an errant company’s future behavior, they often fail to provide 
any remedy to the aggrieved consumer or even act as a deterrent to 
other companies.218 
 
213 See WALDMAN, supra note 9, at 82; see also Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC 
Imposes $5 Billion Penalty and Sweeping New Privacy Restrictions on Facebook (July 24, 
2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/07/ftc-imposes-5-billion-
penalty-sweeping-new-privacy-restrictions [https://perma.cc/73GH-52YN] (explaining 
that the fine was a result of “deceptive disclosures and settings” that undermined user 
privacy preferences). 
214 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 190, at 629. 
215 See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co., 133 F.T.C. 763 (2002) (failure to protect confidentiality of 
user data); Microsoft Corp., 134 F.T.C. 709 (2002) (failure to limit collection of data to the 
purposes outlined in privacy policy); Genica Corp., FTC File No. 082 3113, Docket No. 
C-4252 (F.T.C. Mar. 16, 2009) (failure to provide adequate security for storage of personal 
data). 
216 See GAO-19-52, supra note 200, at 22. The statistic refers to FTC internet privacy 
enforcement actions filed between July 1, 2008 and June 30, 2018 in which the agency 
alleged violations of either the FTC Act or the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act 
(“COPPA”). See id. at 21, 44. But see Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 
799 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 2015) (The FTC brought a claim against Wyndham alleging the 
company committed unfair practices and that its privacy policy was deceptive.); LabMD, 
Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 776 F.3d 1275, 1277 (11th Cir. 2015) (LabMD brought a claim 
against the FTC challenging the agency’s efficacy in bringing enforcements proceedings). 
217 See Michelle de Mooy, How to Strengthen the FTC Privacy & Security Consent 
Decrees, CDT BLOG (Apr. 12, 2018), https://cdt.org/blog/how-to-strengthen-the-ftc-
privacy-security-consent-decrees/ [https://perma.cc/R6J4-798K]. 
218 See GAO-19-52, supra note 200, at 21; see also Nitasha Tiku, Why Facebook’s 2011 
Promises Haven’t Protected Users, WIRED (Apr. 11, 2018, 9:02 PM), https://www.wired.
com/story/why-facebooks-2011-promises-havent-protected-users/ [https://perma.cc/RJ4A
-Q7EH]; Sarah Frier, Former FTC Technologist Says Facebook Violated Consent Decree, 
BLOOMBERG (June 19, 2018, 4:56 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-
06-19/former-ftc-technologist-says-facebook-violated-consent-decree 
[https://perma.cc/L9UU-46N3]. 
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Moreover, the FTC is hamstrung by personnel constraints, 
which further restrict its capacity to regulate and enforce. “Our tools 
are limited,” admits Maneesha Mithal, Associate Director of the 
FTC’s Division of Privacy and Identity Protection.219 Despite  
reports that data privacy and the uncontrolled collection of con-
sumer data remain some of the biggest threats facing the nation,220 
the FTC, as the de facto privacy agency, staffs only forty full-time 
privacy employees and five full-time technologists.221 This pales  
in comparison to the 500-person staff of the United Kingdom  
Information Commissioner’s Office or the 110-person staff of  
Ireland’s Data Protection Commissioner.222 The FTC literally fails 
to employ enough people at the agency to adequately monitor and 
enforce the increasing threats to privacy resulting from the rapid  
expansion of technology and data collection within the private  
tech sector.223 
Since the FTC has taken up the mantle of federal privacy  
watchdog, it has achieved much good.224 However, the limitations 
placed on the agency by its narrow scope of focus, statutory re-
strictions, and physical constraints have produced a quasi-regulatory 
regime ill-suited to adapt to a rapidly changing technological land-
scape that increasingly threatens consumer data privacy. Rather than 
create preemptive rules that anticipate privacy concerns before they 
erupt into problems, the FTC has instead opted for ad hoc individual  
 
219 Lazarus, supra note 209. 
220 See, e.g., Rethinking Privacy for the AI Era, FORBES: INSIGHTS (Mar. 27, 2019, 1:16 
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/insights-intelai/2019/03/27/rethinking-privacy-for-the
-ai-era/ [https://perma.cc/EFX4-F475]; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, BIG DATA: A TOOL 
FOR INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION? 30, 33 (Jan. 2016). 
221 See Cat Zakrzewski, The Technology 202: The Government’s Top Silicon Valley 
Watchdog Only Has Five Full-Time Technologists. Now It’s Asking Congress for More., 




222 See id. 
223 See, e.g., Maass, supra note 191 (citing multiple examples where FTC oversight was 
“scooped” by investigative journalists, foreign agencies, and even ambitious graduate 
students). 
224 See generally Solove & Hartzog, supra note 190. 
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adjudications that are piecemeal and reactive.225 Rather than 
broaden the scope of its enforcement to prosecute unfair practices, 
the FTC has chosen instead to primarily focus on the easier-to- 
monitor prong of deceptive practices. Consequently, the FTC—the 
agency best suited to aggressively and proactively enforce consumer 
data privacy safeguards in the new Digital Age of AI—allows  
Big Data and Big Tech to push the boundaries of the law, to ask for  
forgiveness rather than permission, and to continue to treat  
consumer data as their own personal asset. 
III. THE LAW’S TREATMENT OF THE COLLECTION OF CONSUMER 
DATA BY AI 
A. The Failure of Notice and Choice to Protect Consumers 
In an ideal world, the data privacy laws of the United States 
would protect individuals from three categories of harms that could 
result from the unauthorized collection, unsafe storage or unlicensed 
use of their data: (1) harm to their reputation or autonomy (from the  
involuntary release or use of confidential information); (2) harm to 
their right of access (resulting from discrimination or bias in the mis-
use of information); and (3) harm to their financial and economic 
stability (resulting from a breach or theft of protected infor-
mation).226 Unfortunately, with its lack of comprehensive federal  
directives, its focus on sectoral oversight heavily reliant on the  
principles of “Notice and Choice,” and its emphasis on industry self-
regulation, the current data privacy paradigm in the United States 
provides no such consumer safeguards. The current privacy frame-
work concentrates almost solely on providing consumers with infor-
mation in order to create the illusion of control over their data and 
privacy, and, in doing so, ignores the more crucial element of 
providing protection for the consumer from predatory data collec-
tion practices. This framework puts too much onus on the individual 
 
225 For a counter argument that suggests that FTC jurisprudence has developed a 
comprehensive body of “law” akin to the common law, see generally Solove & Hartzog, 
supra note 190. 
226 See Alan McQuinn, Understanding Data Privacy, REAL CLEAR POL’Y (Oct. 25, 2018), 
https://www.realclearpolicy.com/articles/2018/10/25/understanding_data_privacy_11087
7.html [https://perma.cc/6EFY-2X7Y]. 
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to make “informed” choices and not enough responsibility on the 
companies to refrain from engaging in abusive activity or the federal 
government to police such violations. The current U.S. data privacy 
regime assumes too much and delivers too little.227 
Moreover, the law treats the tech sector’s data collection  
practices as one-size-fits-all, with almost no distinction made across 
divergent platforms about how information is collected, stored or 
used. For example, under current U.S. law, Amazon’s AI-facilitated 
collection of user data via Alexa receives the same legal treatment 
as Amazon’s manual collection of user data through its website or 
mobile app.228 In both instances, the law simply expects that  
Amazon will choose on its own to implement a fair and trustworthy 
process of data collection by providing users with conspicuous  
“notice” of its privacy and collection policies and allowing them  
the “choice” to opt-out of the use of Amazon’s services should  
they disagree. 
For its part, Amazon complies fully with the law’s  
prescriptions.229 The company conspicuously posts its privacy  
policy explaining its data collection practices on its site,230 and it 
allows users the choice of whether or not to avail themselves of the 
tools within the Amazon ecosystem.231 Because the concept of  
engendering consumer trust is embedded in the company’s cultural 
 
227 See supra Section II.C. 
228 See, e.g., Dickinson Wright, The Internet of Toys: Legal and Privacy Issues with 
Connected Toys, LEXOLOGY (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx
?g=73ff6361-5a5e-4511-9a12-95da0e16bd63 [https://perma.cc/QX7Y-33PV] 
(acknowledging that “the law is behind the technology” and describing how the current 
sectoral laws and FTC guidelines apply similarly to data collection across various IoT 
gadgets). But see James Thorne, Amazon Adds HIPAA Compliance to Alexa Skills, Opening 
Door for Secure Health Apps, GEEKWIRE (Apr. 4, 2019, 7:31 AM), https://www.geekwire.
com/2019/amazon-adds-hipaa-compliance-alexa-skills-opening-door-secure-health-apps/ 
[https://perma.cc/HU26-CKRZ] (explaining that Alexa’s collection of PII via its new 
health skills is governed by HIPAA). 
229 As of this writing, Amazon has a conspicuously posted privacy policy and has never 
been charged by the FTC with deceptive or unfair practices in relation to its privacy or data 
collection policies. See infra note 231. 
230 See Amazon Privacy Notice, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/
customer/display.html?nodeId=201909010 [https://perma.cc/TQ53-CVKJ]. 
231 Id. (“You can choose not to provide certain information, but then you might not be 
able to take advantage of many of our features.”). 
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ethos,232 Amazon goes a step further in its policies’ inclusions, 
providing examples of the types of information the company col-
lects,233 the ways in which it collects it,234 how it shares that  
information with third parties,235 and how individuals might access 
their collected data.236 Provided that Amazon then abides by its 
posted policies, it has satisfied all of the elements necessary to  
comport with existing federal privacy standards. 
But what about the protection of the consumer? Is Amazon’s 
mere compliance with “Notice and Choice” enough to provide a 
comprehensive or transparent assessment of Amazon’s intent for all 
of the data collected? Does Amazon’s inclusion of a legal disclaimer 
that their privacy policy can and will be amended based solely on 
the company’s whims237 inherently negate any suggested protection 
implied by the policy itself, or make impossible customer reliance 
 
232 See David Marino-Nachison, Jeff Bezos: Customer Trust ‘Is What Allows You to 
Expand’, BARRON’S (Sept. 4, 2018, 5:04 PM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/jeff-
bezos-customer-trust-is-what-allows-you-to-expand-1536095054 [https://perma.cc/S2KN
-2ZT7] (quoting Jeff Bezos: “[Customer trust is] very valuable, and so you would never do 
anything to jeopardize it.”). 
233 See Amazon Privacy Notice, supra note 231. 
234 See id. 
235 See id. 
236 See id. (“Amazon.com gives you access to a broad range of information about your 
account and your interactions with Amazon.com for the limited purpose of viewing and, in 
certain cases, updating that information.”). The “broad access” that Amazon purports to 
give, however, is extremely limited to the raw data that the user initially provides, rather 
than the algorithmically generated data that Amazon subsequently employs. Amazon 
provides the following as examples of available data:  
Examples of information you can access easily at Amazon.com include 
up-to-date information regarding recent orders; personally identifiable 
information (including name, e-mail, password, communications  
and personalized advertising preferences, address book, and 1-Click 
settings); payment settings (including credit card information and 
promotional certificate and gift card balances); e-mail notification 
settings (including Product Availability Alerts, Delivers, and 
newsletters); Recommendations (including Recommended for You 
and Improve Your Recommendations); shopping lists and gift 
registries (including Wish Lists and Baby and Wedding Registries); 
Seller accounts; and Your Profile (including your product Reviews, 
Recommendations, Listmania lists, Reminders, personal profile, and 
Wish List).  
Id. 
237 See id. 
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upon it? The ambiguity and lack of complete transparency  
sanctioned by the current data privacy paradigm of “Notice and 
Choice” might insulate businesses from legal claims or FTC inquiry, 
but they leave consumers and their data vulnerable to misappropri-
ation, mishandling, and misuse. 
Amazon’s products and services are uniformly governed by a 
blanket privacy policy.238 When a user first creates an Amazon  
account to enter its ecosystem, she sees the following notification: 
“By creating an account, you agree to Amazon’s Conditions of Use 
and Privacy Notice,”239 written in small font beneath the required 
log-in fields. The qualification contains a link, which redirects the 
user to the referenced Conditions of Use and Privacy Notice. Once 
a user clicks “sign in,” no further affirmative action is required to 
assent to Amazon’s terms or policies. Such “acceptance by use” is 
known legally as a browse-wrap agreement and has become a  
standard method by which tech companies comply with “notice.”240 
The mere act of creating an Amazon account or using an Alexa  
device makes consent to Amazon’s policies less a “choice” and 
more a fait accompli. 
The means by which a user interfaces with Alexa can further 
blur the lines of consent. Unlike manually typing items into a search 
bar or mouse clicking a button, an Alexa user simply queries aloud 
as though engaged in conversation with an actual person. Alexa’s 
natural-language processing erases any tactile reminder that one’s 
data is constantly being collected or stored. The convenience and 
ease of using the hardware masks the surreptitious and constant  
surveillance of its software. As a result, Alexa users may be lulled 
into a false sense of security to feel comfortable disclosing to  
Amazon more data than necessary to achieve a requested task—all 
with little understanding as to how this data fed to Alexa might be 
stored or used by Amazon in the future.241 
 
238 See Amazon Privacy Notice, supra note 231. 
239 See Registration, AMAZON, https://amzn.to/2X38E2K [https://perma.cc/6DEB-
NJKX]. 
240 See Ian Rambarran & Robert Hunt, Are Browse-Wrap Agreements All They Are 
Wrapped Up to Be?, 9 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 173, 174 (2007) (defining “browse-
wrap” as an agreement “typically presented at the bottom of the Web site where acceptance 
is based on ‘use’ of the site”). 
241 See WALDMAN, supra note 9, at 141–46. 
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While tech companies such as Amazon tout their adherence to 
the self-regulatory practice of “privacy by design,”242 the loopholes 
deliberately embedded into online interfaces, legal disclaimers, and 
AI collection render ineffective the federal government’s outdated 
regime of “Notice and Choice” as a means to protect users and their 
privacy from predatory data collection practices.243 As Professor 
Woodrow Hartzog argues, “Every aspect of the user experience is 
designed to extract data out of [the user], to get [the user] to never 
stop sharing, and to have [the user] feel good about it in  
the process.”244 
When the FTC initially embraced “Notice and Choice” as the 
cornerstone for consumer data privacy protection, technology was 
limited,245 data storage was prohibitively expensive,246 and data  
collection through intermediaries was a mere by-product of the ser-
vice offered rather than the service itself.247 As a result, companies 
were more selective in the type of data they would collect and would 
maintain only as much information as was necessary for their  
 
242 WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE DESIGN 
OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 5 (2018). 
243 See Sacha Molitorisz, It’s Time for Third-Party Data Brokers to Emerge from the 
Shadows, CONVERSATION (Apr. 4, 2018, 2:46 AM), https://theconversation.com/its-time-
for-third-party-data-brokers-to-emerge-from-the-shadows-94298 [https://perma.cc/ULH9
-WLJJ]. 
244 Daniel Solove, Should Privacy Law Regulate Technological Design? An Interview 
with Woodrow Hartzog, TEACHPRIVACY (Apr. 12, 2018), https://teachprivacy.com/should-
privacy-law-regulate-technological-design-an-interview-with-woodrow-hartzog/ 
[https://perma.cc/6J7C-Z592]. 
245 See Cameron F. Kerry, Proposed Language for Data Collection Standards in Privacy 
Legislation, BROOKINGS (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/
2019/04/16/proposed-language-for-data-collection-standards-in-privacy-legislation/ 
[https://perma.cc/7BXV-BHQC]. 
246 See Lucas Mearian, CW@50: Data Storage Goes from $1M to 2 Cents per Gigabyte, 
COMPUTERWORLD (Mar. 23, 2017, 3:00 AM), https://www.computerworld.com/article/
3182207/cw50-data-storage-goes-from-1m-to-2-cents-per-gigabyte.html 
[https://perma.cc/7U6M-HV73] (explaining that in 1967 one gigabyte of hard drive storage 
would have cost one million dollars, while today it costs two cents); see also HEW REPORT, 
supra note 167, at 22. 
247 See Steven Melendez & Alex Pasternack, Here Are the Data Brokers Quietly Buying 
and Selling Your Personal Information, FAST COMPANY (Mar. 2, 2019), https://www.fast
company.com/90310803/here-are-the-data-brokers-quietly-buying-and-selling-your-
personal-information [https://perma.cc/4Y5G-4FQ3]. 
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immediate purposes.248 But times have changed.249 Thanks in large 
part to Amazon,250 cloud storage today is cheap and scalable, and 
the proliferation of voice-activated AI smart assistants has exponen-
tially increased the scope of data collection.251 The pairing of 
Alexa’s voice-activated, always-on surveillance with Amazon’s  
unlimited cloud server space allows for unrestricted harvesting,  
storage, and manipulation of user data, in which individuals are  
often unwittingly consenting to the perpetual and constant collection 
of their voice, their image, their likes, their habits, their questions, 
and, essentially, their thoughts.252 
“Mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that 
‘what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the  
house-tops.’”253 The siphoning of one’s inviolate personality—the 
very harm that Warren and Brandeis warned against over one  
hundred years ago—is still happening today.254 In 1890 Warren and 
Brandeis were focused on addressing two new technological  
inventions: the portable recording device and the portable camera.255 
Today, these “mechanical devices” have proliferated and invaded 
all spheres of our personal space. They exist in our homes, our cars, 
our offices, and most ubiquitously, our pockets. Although the  
 
248 See Kerry, supra note 246. 
249 See Scott Fulton III, Amazon AWS: Complete Business Guide to the World’s Largest 
Provider of Cloud Services, ZDNET (Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.zdnet.com/article/amazon
-aws-everything-you-should-know-about-the-largest-cloud-provider/ [https://perma.cc/
4M3E-PPU7]. 
250 See id. (“Today, Amazon is the world’s largest provider of computing services 
accessible through the web from globally distributed servers in highly automated data 
centers.”). In 2018, AWS grew forty-seven percent and accounted for the majority of the 
company’s profits that fiscal year. See Stephanie Condon, In 2018 AWS Delivered Most of 
Amazon’s Operating Income, ZDNET (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.zdnet.com/article/in-
2018-aws-delivered-most-of-amazons-operating-income/ [https://perma.cc/AD34-RU9T]. 
251 See Keith D. Foote, A Brief History of Data Storage, DATAVERSITY (Nov. 1, 2017), 
https://www.dataversity.net/brief-history-data-storage/ [https://perma.cc/EZK8-D9CS]. 
252 See The Learning Machine: Amazon’s Empire Rests on Its Low-Key Approach to AI, 
ECONOMIST (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.economist.com/business/2019/04/13/amazons-
empire-rests-on-its-low-key-approach-to-ai [https://perma.cc/T7R3-WW2K] (explaining 
that Amazon is one of AWS’ biggest customers); see also HARTZOG, supra note 243, at 
248–49. 
253 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 23, at 195. 
254 See id. at 205, 211. 
255 See WALDMAN, supra note 9, at 16. 
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technology of these “mechanical devices” has advanced exponen-
tially, the injury to the individual—the intrusion into one’s private 
space—remains the same. Unfortunately, 130 years later, the law 
has failed to evolve to adequately address these concerns.256 
B. Amazon Home. Amazon Health. Amazon, Help!: A Cautionary 
Tale 
A user’s purchase of a voice-enabled Alexa smart assistant  
device signifies more than merely the acquisition of a high-end  
technical gadget; it represents the “filing [of] citizen papers for the 
digital duchy of Amazonia.”257 Amazon wants Alexa and its data-
collecting AI to be ubiquitous; Amazon wants to siphon as much 
personal data from its users as possible.258 Therefore, when a  
consumer opts to buy an Alexa, she makes more than a simple  
utilitarian decision based on product functionality; rather, she 
chooses to adopt an ecosystem into her life and her home—similar 
to adopting a pet—albeit a pet with a doctorate in statistical analysis 
and a highly sophisticated algorithm that can track and analyze 
every aspect of every interaction.259 
Quantitative futurist Amy Webb, founder of the Future Today  
Institute, predicts that by 2029 most of the population will live in 
smart homes—domiciles designed for a 24/7 concierge experience, 
in which a singular AI (such as Amazon’s AI, Alexa) controls,  
and the entire house runs on the algorithmic data outputs of its  
 
256 See, e.g., Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (Plaintiff alleged 
misinformation posted only by the defendant caused harm to his employment prospects, 
which in turn caused him increased anxiety and stress.). The Court dismissed the suit for 
lack of Article III standing for failure to plead a tangible or “concrete” injury—one that 
was “real, and not abstract.” Id. at 1548. This ruling has severely limited the avenues for 
redress for many data subjects who have experienced only reputational or “intangible” 
harms as a result of the misuse of their data. 
257 Steven Levy, Jeff Bezos Owns the Web in More Ways Than You Think, WIRED (Nov. 
13, 2011, 9:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2011/11/ff_bezos/ [https://perma.cc/42AA-
8AX9]. 
258 See Steve Wasserman, The Amazon Effect, NATION (May 29, 2012), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/amazon-effect/ [https://perma.cc/R9WP-RPG2]. 
259 See Ken C. Pohlmann, Big Data and You: The Analytics of Amazon’s Alexa, SOUND 
& VISION (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.soundandvision.com/content/analytics-alexa 
[https://perma.cc/9JL3-TUED] (explaining the technology behind Alexa). 
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inhabitants.260 To many, this scenario sounds blissfully idyllic.  
After all, few would balk at the convenience and efficiency of  
a personalized assistant with the ability to analyze and anticipate 
every interaction in order to remain a step ahead of one’s personal 
needs at all times. But Webb’s vision paints a more cautionary 
tale.261 A smart home, in which every gadget is Alexa-enabled, 
would provide literal 24/7 surveillance of its inhabitants, which 
translates to 24/7 collection of their data, steadily streamed to digital 
dossiers, stored in perpetuity on Amazon’s cloud servers.262 This 
around-the-clock perpetual surveillance would allow Amazon  
to peek behind the curtain and gain access to a more comprehensive 
representation of the consumer and her family.263 Although  
singularly some of the raw data collected may appear harmless  
or even trivial, when synthesized in the aggregate, such seemingly 
innocuous data can lead to harmful and unintended consequences—
especially when that data is coupled with other pieces of collected 
information, analyzed, and re-purposed to predict or affect  
future situations.264 
Amazon may have begun as a simple online bookseller,265 but it 
has grown into a multi-hyphenate conglomerate with tentacles in a 
 
260 See Schwab, supra note 7 (describing Amy Webb’s vision for the future); see also 
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261 See id. 
262 See id. 
263 See id. 
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Amazon, BUS. INSIDER (June 17, 2019, 2:47 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/jeff-
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myriad of retail markets ranging from entertainment266 to grocery267 
to cloud computing.268 While on the surface Amazon’s expansion 
into various marketplaces may look like mere portfolio diversifica-
tion, a deeper analysis reveals that each extension of its realm  
provides the company increased opportunities to collect consumer 
data.269 To date, much of Amazon’s collected data has been  
employed to better predict, streamline, and facilitate users’ transac-
tions and purchases on its retail site.270 However, it begs the  
question, what might happen to the copious amounts of user data 
that Amazon has already collected should the company branch out 
into other non-retail sectors, such as healthcare? 
In January 2018, Amazon announced a joint partnership with JP 
Morgan Chase and Berkshire Hathaway, signaling its entrée into the 
data-driven healthcare sector.271 In November 2018, Amazon 
launched Amazon Comprehend Medical, “a new HIPAA-eligible 
machine learning service that allows developers to process  
unstructured medical text and identify information such as patient 
diagnosis, treatments, dosages, symptoms and signs.”272 In April 
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2019, Amazon announced the release of its first set of HIPAA-
compliant Alexa skills.273 Although “Prime Health” has yet to  
materialize, it remains only a matter of time before that occurs,  
according to investor John Doerr.274 Once that happens, Amazon’s 
vault of collected user data and its ability to effectively manipulate 
that data with its algorithms will give the company an edge  
in a sector that has been notoriously reluctant to embrace  
new technology.275 
The kind of lifestyle and biometric data that Alexa’s AI can now 
collect from its vantage within the home will have tremendous worth 
when it is (inevitably) applied in the context of healthcare, predicts 
Webb.276 Consider the following hypothetical scenario: In an Alexa-
enabled smart home, User X wakes every morning at 8:30 and tasks 
Alexa with calling an Uber to take him to work. User X comes  
home every evening around 6:30, plops himself on the couch, and 
watches five hours of peak television courtesy of Amazon Prime. At 
approximately 11:30 each night, User X yells from his couch for 
Alexa to order him a large pizza with all of the preferred toppings 
and a two-liter bottle of soda. User X is a creature of habit, so this 
routine repeats daily. Amazon collects all of this information—the 
wake-up time and, relatedly, how much time has been spent asleep, 
the destinations of the Uber rides, the types of television programs 
watched, the amount of pizza and soda consumed—all under the 
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guise of providing convenience to the consumer. In addition to the 
basic information that is willingly given to Alexa, Amazon also  
acquires and analyzes recordings of how User X’s voice and attitude 
changed daily in his Interactions. Was he happy, sad, annoyed,  
calm, or agitated? Now, consider what might happen if User X, an  
Amazon Prime subscriber, were to attempt to purchase health  
insurance coverage through Amazon and its “Prime Health”  
Initiative. Although on his application he might paint himself as an 
average male living a relatively healthy lifestyle, what is to stop  
Amazon from employing the information it has already collected  
on him to determine that his lifestyle and diet put him in a risk  
category such that his Prime Health insurance premiums would  
be higher than the average individual or that he might be denied  
coverage altogether? Under current U.S. data privacy regulations, 
the unfortunate answer is: absolutely nothing. 
Why should consumers care about what happens to their data 
once it is disclosed to a collector like Amazon? What is the harm? 
After all, the more that Amazon or a data collector knows about a 
user, the better the quality of customized, tailored concierge service 
it can provide. Admittedly, it is difficult to care when the true  
potential for harm remains unknown; however, this is precisely 
when the law must step in and proactively protect consumers. Under 
the current regulatory regime, users and even the data collectors 
themselves do not always know who is on the receiving end of the 
information collected or how that information might ultimately be 
used.277 As Professor Louis Menand presciently articulated, “[T]he 
danger of data collection by online companies is not that they will 
use it to try to sell you stuff. The danger is that that information can 
so easily fall into the hands of parties whose motives are much less 
benign.”278 Would users so readily offer personal information if  
they understood that government agencies like the Drug Enforce-
ment Administration, Internal Revenue Service, and U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection regularly request, collect, and store  
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information gathered from data collectors?279 How violated did  
users feel when their information was unknowingly siphoned by 
Cambridge Analytica prior to the 2016 election?280 Absent a  
comprehensive regulatory regime that prioritizes and safeguards 
personal data privacy interests, Big Tech and Big Data companies 
will remain free to exploit the trust and, moreover, the liberty of the  
average consumer.281 
C. The Power of Purpose Limitation and Data Minimization 
The health insurance hypothetical outlined in Section II.B. 
above presents a realistic and not-too-distant-future example of how  
seemingly harmless bits of data collected through Alexa’s AI for one 
purpose might be stored, re-analyzed and re-deployed by Amazon 
for a completely different purpose, and how such “intangible harms” 
might harm the consumer.282 While Amazon has yet to achieve total 
 
279 See Alan Henry, Why You Should Care About and Defend Your Privacy, LIFEHACKER 
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worried about, but that the real issue is a curtailment of liberty or the freedom to choose). 
282 For a more positive spin on an example, consultants Debbie Hoffman and Maureen 
Hydox suggest that:  
Amazon can leverage consumer purchasing data with health 
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omniscience through an Alexa-controlled data-fueled ecosystem, 
the repurposing of collected user data is likely already occurring.283 
As Jeff Bezos readily admits, “We never throw away data.”284 
Unfortunately, existing U.S. data privacy laws do little to pro-
vide consumers protection from such data repurposing. Amazon’s 
privacy policy contains a section that explains how and with whom 
the company shares user data.285 “Subsidiaries of Amazon” are 
among the recipient list.286 As such, the consumer, upon creation of 
her Amazon account, grants Amazon the right to collect her data and 
consents to its dissemination among Amazon’s various divisions 
and subsidiaries.287 As the current U.S. privacy regime treats  
consumer data as an asset of the company that collects it rather than 
of the individual who discloses it, the law would view a user’s  
disclosure to Alexa as voluntary and Amazon’s subsequent reuse 
within its own ecosystem as perfectly legal.288 
So, the question remains, how should the U.S. legal paradigm 
shift to better protect the privacy rights of the data subject and ensure 
that data collected will not harm the subject? One answer lies in  
the embrace and implementation of two oft-forgotten privacy  
principles: purpose limitation and data minimization.289 Although 
these doctrines have existed as part of the FIPPs since 1973, have 
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been embraced by the OECD,290 and have served as the driving 
forces behind the EU’s privacy policies, they have been largely  
ignored as regulating forces within the United States.291 
The purpose limitation principle contains two distinct elements: 
(1) data must only be collected for purposes that are specified (prior 
to collection), explicit and legitimate; and (2) such data must not  
be further processed in a way that is incompatible with those  
purposes.292 In the event that an entity wishes to employ collected 
data for a purpose other than that for which it was originally  
collected, affirmative consent from the user would be required.  
Purpose limitation returns a degree of control to the user and  
holds data collectors accountable. It helps to ensure that one’s  
personal data, collected with consent for one purpose (e.g., to affect 
a financial transaction such as ordering a pizza), would not be  
indefinitely stored and indiscriminately reused for a different  
or non-compatible purpose (e.g., to determine eligibility for 
healthcare coverage). 
Data minimization requires that the amount of information  
collected, used, accessed, or stored be only the minimum necessary 
to achieve the specified purpose.293 In practice this means that data 
collectors must limit the collection, storage, and usage of personal 
data to only that which is relevant, adequate, and essential to  
accomplish the stated purpose for which the data has been initially 
processed. According to advocates of the principle, adherence  
to data minimization not only protects a data subject’s privacy  
interests, but also increases efficiency and reduces risk to the data 
collector.294 The less unnecessary data that a company keeps on 
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hand, the easier and faster it is to locate and employ relevant data.295 
The deletion of data that no longer serves its purpose further limits 
a company’s exposure to breach.296 Data minimization, therefore, 
limits the volume of personal information stored by data collectors 
and further ensures that such personal data cannot be collected, 
stored, or accessed in perpetuity without affirmative consent from 
the user.297 
The two FIPPs principles of purpose limitation and data  
minimization work in tandem to guarantee that data disclosed by 
users and collected by brokers remain accurate, relevant, and  
protected. By embracing these principles alongside those of notice 
and choice, and implementing them through comprehensive federal 
data privacy legislation, the current legal paradigm in the United 
States would shift from one focused on protecting the desires of the 
tech sector towards one more focused on protecting the information 
and privacy of the consumer. 
D. Proposed Legislative Solutions 
The failure of the United States to implement comprehensive 
federal data privacy reform has created a privacy vortex in which 
data brokers dominate—dictating a “collect now, decide later”  
approach to collection—and consumers remain exposed prey to the 
predatory practices of the tech sector. The current privacy paradigm 
asymmetrically favors the private tech sector, sanctions dragnet  
surveillance and leaves data subjects susceptible to financial,  
emotional, and reputational harm. 
 
295 See id. 
296 See id. 
297 See Marr, supra note 284. 
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1. The States 
Despite the recent escalation of hacks,298 breaches,299 and  
egregious exploitation of consumer data by tech companies  
themselves,300 the United States still refuses to adopt a more  
stringent and comprehensive federal data privacy policy. As threats 
to consumer data privacy increase, the need for comprehensive  
federal legislation to address these issues intensifies. Unwilling  
to wait for Congress, and recognizing a need for immediate action, 
the state legislatures in California, Vermont, and Illinois have taken 
action to protect their constituents’ data privacy.301 Other states, 
such as Hawaii, Massachusetts, and New York, have followed the 
earlier states’ lead and thus have similar consumer data privacy  
legislation pending.302 
a) California 
Unlike the Federal Constitution, California’s State Constitution 
grants its citizens a right of privacy.303 In keeping with that right, the 
state had previously enacted privacy legislation that mandates  
disclosure to users when their data has been breached304 and  
demands the provision of clear and conspicuous privacy policies for 
any business online that collects a California citizen’s personal 
data.305 In June 2018, California’s state legislature passed the  
California Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”), a sweeping privacy  
 
298 See, e.g., Joseph Cox, Hacker Breaches Securus, the Company That Helps Cops Track 
Phones Across the US, MOTHERBOARD (May 16, 2018, 1:16 PM), https://motherboard.
vice.com/en_us/article/gykgv9/securus-phone-tracking-company-hacked 
[https://perma.cc/YTQ8-SQKM]. 
299 See, e.g., Lily Hay Newman, The Wired Guide to Data Breaches, WIRED (Dec. 7, 
2018, 9:00 AM) https://www.wired.com/story/wired-guide-to-data-breaches/ 
[https://perma.cc/CTD7-K8RX]. 
300 See, e.g., Matthew Rosenberg & Sheera Frankel, Facebook’s Role in Data Misuse 
Sets Off Storms on Two Continents, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/03/18/us/cambridge-analytica-facebook-privacy-data.html [https://perma.cc/
C6GC-M27E]. 
301 See infra notes 304–22 and accompanying text. 
302 See infra notes 323–36 and accompanying text. 
303 CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1. 
304 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.29(a), 1798.82(a) (West 2019). 
305 California Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575–
22579 (2004). 
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reform bill that in many ways mirrors the EU’s GDPR.306 The CCPA 
protects California citizens by embracing the principles of purpose 
limitation and data minimization, increasing the transparency of 
data collectors’ policies, and providing the consumer with a “right 
to be forgotten.”307 While the California law enacts substantial  
protections, its applications reach only as far as California resi-
dents.308 As the law does not take effect until 2020,309 it remains to 
be seen what, if any, impact such regulation will have on businesses’  
treatment of consumers in the remaining forty-nine states. 
b) Vermont 
In May of 2018, Vermont passed Act 171, which aims to  
regulate and hold third party data brokers accountable for the sale 
and misuse of consumers’ personal data.310 The legislation, which 
took effect January 1, 2019, aims to return some degree of control 
back to the consumer by attempting to thwart the all-too-common, 
yet rarely-discussed, practice of shadow profiling—the wholesale 
collection and subsequent resale of consumer data aggregated from 
thousands of data points garnered from multiple sources (e.g.,  
browsing history, online purchases, public records, location data311) 
by entities who lack a direct relationship with the consumer.312  
Vermont’s legislation compels all third-party data brokers operating 
in Vermont to be registered with the state,313 mandates disclosure of 
 
306 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 (2018). 
307 See id. §§ 1798.100(a)–(e), 1798.105. 
308 See id. § 1798.140(g). 
309 See id. 
310 An Act Relating to Data Brokers and Consumer Protection, No. 171, 2018 Vt. Acts 
& Resolves 584 (codified as VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2430, 2433, 2446–67, 2480b, 2480h). 
The act defines “data broker” broadly as “a business, or unit or units of a business, 
separately or together, that knowingly collects and sells or licenses to third parties the 
brokered personal information of a consumer with whom the business does not have a 
direct relationship.” VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2430(4). 
311 See id. § 1(a)(1)(B). 
312 See Katherine E. Armstrong, Vermont First State to Pass Data Broker Law, NAT’L L. 
REV. (June 4, 2018), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/vermont-first-state-to-pass-
data-broker-law [https://perma.cc/6HAP-HTGU]; Devin Coldewey, Vermont Passes First 
Law to Crack Down on Data Brokers, TECHCRUNCH (May 27, 2018) https://techcrunch.
com/2018/05/27/vermont-passes-first-first-law-to-crack-down-on-data-brokers/ 
[https://perma.cc/LE4L-T8JT]. 
313 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2446(a) (West 2019). 
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collected information pertaining to one’s credit scores or report,314 
requires that security protocols be in place to protect the collected 
data,315 and imposes steep penalties for violations.316 While the  
Vermont law is the first to hold accountable third-party data brokers, 
it fails to address or hold accountable first-party data brokers (like  
Amazon).317 Therefore, businesses that (a) collect data in the natural 
course of trade, (b) have a direct relationship with the consumer, 
such as websites, apps, or e-commerce platforms, and (c) do not  
resell data to third parties are not subject to the law. The law also 
fails to require consumer consent to the collection or subsequent sale 
of the data. If the aim of the law is transparency, then affirmative 
consumer consent—not simply an “opt-out” provision—should  
be required. 
c) Illinois 
Although specifically engineered to protect the collection of  
biometric data (e.g., facial/retina scan, fingerprint, DNA), Illinois’ 
Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”)318 safeguards the  
consumer by incorporating the principles of purpose limitation and 
data minimization.319 Additionally, BIPA authorizes a private right 
of action to allow individual consumers to directly sue infringing 
companies.320 Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the courts have 
interpreted BIPA as a strict liability statute.321 This means that mere 
violation of the law is enough to establish a concrete injury that can 
provide plaintiffs with standing; no other “tangible” harm need be 
shown to bring a cause of action.322 
 
314 Id. § 2480(b). 
315 Id. § 2447. 
316 Id. § 2446(b). 
317 See id. 
318 Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/1 (2008). 
319 Id. § 15(a), (d). 
320 Id. § 20(1)–(4). 
321 See Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 2019 Ill. LEXIS 7, at **17 (Ill. Sup. Ct. 
2019). 
322 In order to establish Article III standing in the court, a party must adequately allege 
three elements: (1) an injury in fact (the invasion of a legally protected interest that is (a) 
concrete and particularized and (b) actual and imminent); (2) a causal connection between 
the claimed injury and the alleged act(s) of the defendant, such that the injury is fairly 
traceable to the defendant’s act(s) and not the independent action of another third party; 
and (3) that it is likely, and not merely speculative, that the alleged injury will be redressed 
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d) Pending State Legislation 
Inspired by California’s swift passage of CCPA, the state  
legislatures of Hawaii,323 Maryland,324 Massachusetts,325  
Mississippi,326 Nevada,327 North Dakota,328 New Mexico,329 New 
York,330 Rhode Island, 331 and Washington332 introduced similar 
comprehensive, omnibus, GDPR-influenced, consumer data privacy 
legislation at the beginning of 2019. New York also introduced a bill 
similar to BIPA focused on biometric privacy.333 The latter half of 
2019 saw Mississippi’s bill die in committee, New Mexico’s bill  
effectively die with an “action postponed indefinitely” status,334 and 
North Dakota’s bill reduced to a proposal for a legislative manage-
ment study.335 In May 2019, Nevada passed S.B. 220, which 
amended its current notification law to allow for users to opt out of 
the sale of their information to third parties. The bill further provides 
a private right of action for any person injured by a violation of  
the new right to opt out or the existing obligations to provide  
notice.336 The remaining six state bills are pending in various stages 
of discussion within their respective committees. 
 
by a favorable decision. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
Plaintiffs in data privacy and data breach litigation cases have often struggled with the issue 
of standing. While a data breach may cause harm, unless that harm resulted in a monetary 
loss, the injury-in-fact element, where it is concrete and particularized, is difficult to prove. 
See also Priscilla Fasoro & Lauren Wiseman, Standing Issues in Data Breach Litigation: 
An Overview, INSIDE PRIVACY (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.insideprivacy.com/data-
security/data-breaches/standing-issues-in-data-breach-litigation-an-overview/ 
[https://perma.cc/NU86-2FSD]. 
323 S.B. 418, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2019). 
324 S.B. 613, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2019). 
325 S.B. 120, 191st Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2019). 
326 H.B. 1253, 134th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2019). 
327 S.B. 220, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2019). 
328 H.B. 1485, 66th Leg., Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2019). 
329 S.B. 176, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2019). 
330 S.B. 224, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019). 
331 S.B. 234, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2019). 
332 S.B. 5376, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019). 
333 S.B. 8547, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2018). 
334 S.B 176, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2019). 
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e) State Data Breach Notification Statutes 
In addition to the pending data privacy statutes mentioned 
above, all fifty states have also enacted some version of a data 
breach notification statute, which imposes data protection standards 
on companies that collect personal information and mandates  
disclosure protocols when a data breach occurs.337 While these  
statutes help inform consumers when their data has been breached, 
hacked, or stolen, they unfortunately do little to address the way data 
is collected, to prevent misuse of the collected data, or even to  
provide courses of action to remedy affected consumers. 
2. The Federal Government 
In 2015, President Obama proposed a federal privacy bill—the 
Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act—that aimed to give consumers 
more control over their data and attempted to establish a baseline for 
the way businesses should treat the collection, storage, and use of 
consumer data.338 Although the proposed bill adopted many of the 
FIPPs—transparency, notice, choice, purpose limitation, and data 
minimization339—it received criticism from privacy advocacy 
groups as well as the tech sector.340 The former argued the proposal 
did not go far enough to protect consumers, while the latter  
contended such federal regulation was confusing and would stifle 
innovation.341 Unfortunately, the plan never gained enough traction 
in Congress to become law. 
 
337 See Caleb Skeath & Brooke Kahn, State Data Breach Notification Laws: 2018 in 
Review, INSIDE PRIVACY (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.insideprivacy.com/data-security/
data-breaches/state-data-breach-notification-laws-2018-in-review/ 
[https://perma.cc/H7YN-2JF7]. 
338 See WHITE HOUSE, ADMINISTRATION DISCUSSION DRAFT: CONSUMER PRIVACY BILL OF 
RIGHTS ACT OF 2015 (proposed Feb. 27, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
sites/default/files/omb/legislative/letters/cpbr-act-of-2015-discussion-draft.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3PYW-GN8Q] (currently before the Committee on the Judiciary). The 
discussion draft differs substantively from the Bill that ultimately went to the Senate. See 
Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2015, S. 1158, 114th Cong. (2015). 
339 See id. §§ 101–04. 
340 See Brendan Sasso, Obama’s ‘Privacy Bill of Rights’ Gets Bashed from All Sides, 
ATLANTIC (Feb. 27, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/02/obamas-
privacy-bill-of-rights-gets-bashed-from-all-sides/456576/ [https://perma.cc/UJ5S-
KDVN]. 
341 See id. 
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More recently, however, several Senators, including Brian 
Schatz (D-HI), Mark Warner (D-VA) and Edward Markey (D-MA), 
have drafted federal data privacy proposals for Senate consideration. 
Senator Schatz’s Data Care Act of 2018 borrows from Jack Balkin’s 
theories and aims to establish a fiduciary relationship between data 
brokers and data subjects.342 His bill would impose fiduciary duties 
of care, loyalty, and confidentiality onto data brokers to ensure that 
collected data could not be used in a manner that would bring  
harm to the data subject. Senator Warner’s DETOUR Act also  
embraces the idea of imposing fiduciary duties upon data collectors, 
but focuses more on regulating predatory design elements such  
as the user interface and the algorithmic equations that siphon 
data.343 Warner’s bill recommends heightening the standard of 
transparency for algorithms that govern data collection, expanding 
and empowering the FTC to become the official privacy regulator, 
and adopting GDPR-like structures to protect data subjects.344 
Senator Markey’s Privacy Bill of Rights Act eschews the  
problematic information fiduciary construct345 and instead proposes 
a return to the FIPPs and the empowerment of the individual user.346 
In doing so, however, Markey’s bill suggests a loose framework—
including the principles of purpose limitation and data minimization 
as well as affirmative “opt-in” consent—but does not actually pass 
any regulation at all. Instead, it shifts the onus for such regulation to 
the FTC to promulgate rules that comport with the ideals set forth  
in his legislation.347 
To date, each of the federal legislative proposals has been  
introduced or is currently under consideration in its respective  
committee.348 However, none has garnered the bipartisan or tech 
 
342 See Data Care Act of 2018, S. 3744, 115th Cong. (2018). 
343 See Deceptive Experiences To Online Users Reduction Act, S. 1084, 116th Cong. 
(2019) 
344 See id. 
345 See Kahn & Pozen, supra note 126 (arguing that the imposition of fiduciary duties on 
data collectors creates a conflict with the fiduciary duties already owed shareholders and 
thus, a legally untenable paradigm). 
346 See Privacy Bill of Rights Act, S. 1214, 116th Cong. (2019). 
347 See id. §§ 3–4. 
348 See Congressional Chronicle, C-SPAN, https://www.c-span.org/congress/bills/bill/?
116/s1214 [https://perma.cc/T4UQ-FNAZ] (status: introduced); id., https://www.c-span.
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sector support necessary to achieve passage. Moreover, while each 
proposal contains a noteworthy or important element that attacks a 
particular issue of data privacy or data protection, no singular piece 
of legislation has presented the kind of comprehensive, omnibus  
reform necessary to address the rising threats posed by the rapid  
advancement of data collection technology via AI. 
IV. MOVING FORWARD: A HYBRID PROPOSAL FOR THE FUTURE 
Today, the technology of AI, the internet, and the IoT transcends 
the previous constraints of physical or geographic boundaries. Big 
Data collectors such as Amazon now operate in an interconnected 
global economy where data functions as the prime currency.349 The 
current threats posed to consumer data privacy by unregulated  
tech entities cannot be mitigated by a disparate patchwork of  
localized, state, or sectoral solutions. The only way to effectively 
and efficiently curtail these privacy risks is to pass comprehensive,  
federal consumer data privacy legislation that will impose  
restrictions on the collection of personal data regardless of the sector 
or entity collecting, establish baselines for acceptable collection 
practices, outline prohibitions for the collection, storage, and usage 
of personal data, and uniformly enforce penalties for violations 
across all fifty states. 
Given the pace at which data collection technology continues to 
advance and the exponential growth of the tech sector’s thirst to  
exploit such collected data, the current self-regulatory regime can 
no longer be sustained. The government must intervene. However, 
for federal legislation to be effective and efficient in regulating  
entities and protecting the consumer from predatory data collection, 
retention, and use, it must address several key elements. 
 
org/congress/bills/bill/?116/s1084 [https://perma.cc/3NFT-CYU3] (status: introduced); 
id., https://www.c-span.org/congress/bills/bill/?115/s3744 [https://perma.cc/7MW9-G3
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349 See The World’s Most Valuable Resource Is No Longer Oil, but Data, ECONOMIST 
(May 6, 2017), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/the-worlds-most-
valuable-resource-is-no-longer-oil-but-data [https://perma.cc/QWB9-48JT]. 
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A. A Return to the FIPPs and the Establishment of a Consumer 
Privacy Bill of Rights 
One of the main focuses for new federal legislation must be to 
allow consumers to reclaim and retain control of their data. Due to 
the failure of “Notice and Choice,” consumers have only the illusion 
of control; however, once they consent to engage with a company, 
any control over their data subsequently resides in the hands of the 
data collectors and not the data subjects.350 To empower and protect 
the consumer, therefore, federal legislation must shift the privacy 
paradigm away from dependence solely on “Notice and Choice” and 
towards a regime that adopts all of the FIPPs, including the key  
principles of purpose limitation and data minimization,351 as  
outlined by the OECD352 rather than the FTC. 
The full array of FIPPs—including purpose limitation and data 
minimization—must be incorporated and codified into a federal 
Consumer Bill of Rights, which would comprehensively outline the 
freedoms bestowed upon and powers granted to the consumer across 
all fifty states. Borrowing aspects from the GDPR353 and Obama’s 
original 2012 privacy proposal,354 the Bill of Rights should establish 
a baseline for consumer data protection and demand that data  
collectors provide users with the transparency necessary to identify, 
access, interrogate, correct and delete all collected information. All 
such rights should be applied not only proactively but also  
retroactively, so that data collected prior to legislation would be  
subject to the same restrictions and regulations. 
B. A Dedicated Privacy Regulatory Body 
Congress has never delegated privacy oversight to any regula-
tory body; therefore, new federal legislation must rectify this  
previous omission. Since the FTC has become the de facto privacy 
 
350 See supra Section III.A. 
351 See supra Section III.B.  
352 The FIPPs under the OECD include principles of collection limitation, data quality, 
purpose specification, use limitation, security safeguards, openness, individual 
participation, and accountability. See OECD Framework, supra note 290. 
353 See GDPR, supra note 141, ch. 3, at 39–47. 
354 See WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A 
FRAMEWORK OF PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL 
DIGITAL ECONOMY 10 (2012). 
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regulator,355 it seems most efficient to keep oversight under their 
auspices. However, in doing so, it is further imperative to create a 
dedicated data privacy division within the larger federal agency that 
is adequately staffed, funded, and endowed with the full range of 
regulatory tools necessary to effectively and efficiently enforce the 
more-robust data privacy laws that this Note envisions. This means 
that full rulemaking authority under Section 553 would need to be 
restored for privacy oversight; thus, the restrictive amendments of 
Moss–Magnuson and the FTC Improvement Act should be repealed 
for data privacy regulations. Additionally, any FTC-led regulatory 
body would need to have the ability to prosecute all federal data  
privacy violations as well as any violations of Section 5 of the  
FTC Act. 
C. Civil Right of Action 
Much of the legislation that has been proposed at the state and 
federal level focuses on government-based action against private 
sector statutory violations. However, a crucial element that should 
be included in any future data privacy legislation is a civil right of 
action, which may be triggered by a mere violation of a statutory 
provision.356 The creation of a strict liability regime for data privacy 
violations would allow victims of predatory data practices a means 
by which to seek judicial redress. Without it, consumers who have 
suffered at the hands of Big Data and Big Tech would likely not be 
able to bring tech companies to court.357 The inclusion of a strict 
liability civil right of action would allow consumers to demonstrate 
a concrete harm and would eliminate the issues of standing that have 
previously crippled plaintiffs who have attempted to bring civil suits 
against companies for data breaches.358 To make recovery easier for 
the consumer and to limit the litigation costs for violative data  
collectors, a civil right of action provision could also include tiered 
statutory damages depending on the magnitude of the breach. 
 
355 See supra Section II.D. 
356 See, e.g., Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/1 (2005). 
357 See discussion supra note 323. 
358 For a more detailed explanation of this issue, see supra note 257. 
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D. State Law Preemption 
Comprehensive federal privacy legislation must also address the 
contentious issue of state law preemption. Since the passage of the 
CCPA, California representatives Jackie Spier and Ro Khanna have 
been vocal in their opposition to the potential preemption of their 
state’s comprehensive privacy law by federal legislation.359 They  
remain concerned that federal legislation will create a less stringent 
framework for consumer privacy protection. If Congress adequately 
addresses the issues currently plaguing consumers—issues that have 
already been addressed by several state bills360—then preemption 
should become a non-issue. However, if Congress punts and passes 
a bill that fails to solve the holistic problem identified by this Note, 
then states will rightfully see a need to step in to more fully protect 
their constituents. Therefore, to avoid these issues, a federal bill 
should use the structure and thresholds established by the CCPA (or 
other comprehensive state laws) as a baseline or “floor” for any  
legislation. If the aim is to create a uniform set of rules for the tech 
sector to follow across all fifty states, the federal bill should be no 
less stringent or exacting than any current state bill. However, in the 
event that the federal bill passes with less exacting measures than 
current state laws, states must be permitted to enact stricter legis-
lation to fill the gaps. 
E. The Promotion of Innovation 
Finally, although comprehensive data privacy reform should  
primarily focus on the protection of the consumer from predatory 
practices, it is crucial that any legislation in this area maintains  
ample space to allow the tech sector to continue to innovate, expand, 
and foster competition. Although the era of self-regulation must 
come to an end, any regulatory regime will have far more success 
working with the entities regulated rather than working  
against them. 
 
359 See Cristiano Lima & John Hendel, California Democrats to Congress: Don’t 
Bulldoze Our Privacy Law, POLITICO (Feb. 21, 2019, 5:07 AM), https://www.politico.com/
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360 See supra Section III.D.1. 
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CONCLUSION 
As the manipulation of Big Data continues to produce big  
profits, the threats to consumer data privacy continue to escalate. 
Today, thanks to Amazon’s ubiquitous Alexa and other smart  
assistants, the data collection capabilities of AI have infiltrated  
the most personal spheres of its users such as the home. It is only a  
matter of time before AI dominates other traditionally “protected” 
spaces such as our cars,361 our businesses,362 and our classrooms.363 
Although the innovations of the tech sector need not be stifled 
simply because consumers desire data privacy protection, the tech 
sector can no longer be permitted to run roughshod over consumers’ 
rights under the guise of progress. The United States’ patchwork 
sectoral regime of the past must give way to comprehensive reform 
for the future. Congress can and should work to implement compre-
hensive protections to consumer data privacy that will increase 
transparency, minimize predatory collection, storage and use  
practices, and empower the individual consumer over the tech  
industry. The clocks cannot be turned back, nor can data already 
collected necessarily be returned. However, by passing comprehen-
sive legislation that will institute a uniform system of federally  
mandated rules and regulations, the government can begin to protect 
the autonomy, reputation and financial security of the consumer and 
safeguard the personal data privacy rights of the individual. 
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